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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
: Case No. 20040289-SC 
v. 
HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison 
Warden, 
Appellee/Respondent : 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Menzies appeals the denial of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) relief from the judgment denying 
post-conviction relief from his capital murder conviction and death sentence. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(i) (West 2004). 
ISSUE STATEMENTS AND REVIEW STANDARDS 
1. In T.S. v. State, 82 P.3d 1104, 2003 UT 54, where the Court recognized a statutory 
right to the effective assistance of appointed counsel in parental termination cases, this Court 
held that a party's negligent and intentional acts may make it inequitable to grant relief even if 
the party proves that his appointed counsel was ineffective. If T.S. applies to this case, did the 
rule 60(b) court properly deny relief from the post-conviction judgment based on its finding that 
Mr. Menzies' intentional and negligent acts barred relief? 
2. Should the Court affirm on the alternative bases that: 1) the Court should not 
recognize a statutory right to the effective assistance of capital post-conviction counsel; and 2) 
if the Court does recognize such a right, Mr. Menzies never proved that it was violated? 
3. May a client rely on his counsel's deficient performance to demonstrate "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" justifying relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)? 
Alternatively, did Mr. Menzies timely seek rule 60(b)(1) relief or prove that he had any 
meritorious claims? 
4. Did Mr. Menzies prove a due process violation that deprived the post-conviction 
court of the authority to deny post-conviction relief? 
5. Does a final judgment with no executory features have "prospective application"? 
Has Mr. Menzies identified any new developments that make it inequitable to leave the judgment 
in place? 
6. If the Court does reverse the denial of rule 60(b) relief, does equity require starting 
from the beginning a ten-year-old case collaterally reviewing a seventeen-year-old conviction and 
sentence for a nearly twenty-year-old murder? 
The first six issues challenge the denial of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) relief from the post-
conviction judgment. The rule 60(b) court had broad discretion to decide whether to set aside 
the judgment This Court may reverse that decision only if the court abused its broad decision. 
See, e.g., Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 2000 UT 751ffl9-l0. Mr. Menzies did not preserve many of 
his appellate arguments. He may succeed on those arguments only if he establishes plain error. 
See, e.g., State v. Kelt, 61 P.3d 1019, 2002 UT 106 f32; State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 2000 UT 74 
ffijll-19; State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 403-405 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). 
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7. Should the rule 60(b) court have ordered respondent to shred documents that 
respondent did not obtain from Mr. Menzies? 
Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding discovery issues, and this Court will reverse 
only if the trial court abused it. Green v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638, 2001 UT 62 [^2. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains United States Constitution Amendment 6; Utah Code Ann. 78-
35a-202 (West 2004); Utah R. Crim. P. 8 and 12; Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); Utah R Evid. 201; and 
Utah Administrative Code 25-14-6. 
CASE STATEMENT1 
Criminal proceedings 
Some time before 10:00 p.m. on February 23,1986, Ms. Maurine Hunsaker disappeared 
from the service station where she worked. On February 25,1986, a hiker found her body at 
Storm Mountain picnic area. She had been strangled and her throat had been cut. See generally 
State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393,396 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995); GT. 1009-1012. 
The State charged Mr. Menzies with Ms. Hunsaker's murder. Id. at 397. The trial lasted 
one month and concluded more than two years after the murder. Id.; Crim.R. 1096. 
At trial, the State proved, among other things, that Troy Denter loaned his car to Mr. 
Menzies at approximately 8:00 p.m. the night Ms. Hunsaker disappeared. Mr. Menzies asked 
to borrow it until approximately 10:00 p.m. When Mr. Denter called Mr. Menzies' apartment 
xThe criminal case record and transcripts have not been separately numbered for this 
appeal. Respondent will refer to the criminal record numbers at "CrimR." Respondent will 
refer to the criminal transcripts by date and page number. 
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at approximately 11:00 p.m. to ask about the car, Mr. Menzies' girlfriend, Nicole Arnold, said 
that Mr. Menzies was not there. When Mr. Denter contacted Mr. Menzies at approximately 1:00 
a.m., Mr. Menzies asked to keep the car until the following day because "he just had one more 
order of business to take care of;" Mr. Menzies returned the car at approximately noon. (2/23-
24/88 transcript at 1397-1402,1409.) 
The morning after Ms. Hunsaker disappeared, a witness saw at Storm Mountain a car 
similar to Mr. Denter's, a woman wearing clothes similar to those found on Ms. Hunsaker's 
body, and a man with the woman who looked like Mr. Menzies and wore a maroon and grey 
parka similar to his (2/18-19/88 transcript at 1193-98,1201-1213,1270,1284-86; 2/23-24/88 
transcript at 1332-38,1394; 2/25-26/88 transcript at 1685).2 Police found a cigarette butt at the 
crime scene that tested positive for an enzyme common to Mr. Menzies, Ms. Hunsaker, and 
thirty-six percent of the population (3/1-2/88 transcript at 1991-93).3 The medical examiner 
concluded that knives later identified as Mr, Menzies5 could have caused the neck wounds that 
Ms. Hunsaker suffered (2/25-26/88, transcript at 1610-15). Ms. Hunsaker had marks on her 
wrists consistent with having been handcuffed and pulled by the wrists; Ms. Arnold's mother 
found handcuffs in Mr. Menzies' maroon and grey parka, and Troy Denter found a box labeled 
2The witness provided police with a description within one inch in height and ten 
pounds in weight of Mr. Menzies. He accurately described Mr. Menzies' hair, facial hair, and 
glasses. He helped create a composite drawing so accurate that detectives included Mr. 
Menzies' photograph as one of three from among two hundred jail inmates that matched the 
composite. State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d at 401. 
3Respondent moved to release the cigarette butt to the state crime lab to evaluate 
whether it could be tested for DNA, and, if so, to test the butt for DNA (R. 4138). Mr. 
Menzies opposed the motion (R. 4144). 
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"handcuffs" under the seat of his car (2/23-24/88, transcript at 1404-1405,1482). 
The day after Ms. Hunsaker disappeared and the day before the hiker found her body, 
police arrested Mr. Menzies on an unrelated charge. During the booking process, Mr. Menzies 
ran to a changing room in the jail, where jail personnel found four of Ms. Hunsaker's 
identification cards (2/23-24/88 transcript at 1519-22,1548-52,1561-63,1566,1572-74; 2/25-
26/88 transcript at 1731-32). Mr. Menzies telephoned Mr. Denter from jail and asked him to 
retrieve $115 from Mr. Menzies' apartment to buy some things for Ms. Arnold. Mr. Denter 
spent approximately $25 from the $115. Police later seized $90 in cash from Mr. Menzies' 
apartment. An accounting revealed that approximately $116 was missing from the station. 
(2/18-19/88 transcript at 1178; 2/23-24/88, transcript at 1423-24,1477; 2/25-26/88 transcript 
at 1745-47.) 
Chemical analysis and microscopic examination demonstrated that green shag carpet 
fibers found on Ms. Hunsaker's clothing were similar to green shag carpet from Mr. Menzies' 
apartment (2/25-26/88 transcript at 1688-90, 1892; 3/1-2/88 transcript at 1965-74). Ms. 
Arnold's step-father found Ms. Hunsaker's social security card in Ms. Arnold's belongings 
(2/23-24/88, transcript at 1498, 1506-1508). Police seized from Mr. Menzies' apartment Ms. 
Hunsaker's brown suede purse with a broken strap (2/18-19/88 transcript at 989-90; 2/25-
26/88 transcript at 1743). Police found Ms. Hunsaker's thumb print on the passenger window 
of the car that Mr. Menzies borrowed from Mr. Denter (2/25-26/88 transcript at 1779,1787-
88). 
The jury heard Mr. Walter Britton's preliminary hearing testimony recounting Mr. 
5 
Menzies' admission that he murdered Ms. Hunsaker. (3/1-2/88, transcript at 2080-85.) The jury 
also heard Mr. Menzies' story about picking up a young woman and driving around until they 
got stuck in the mud (2/25-26/88 transcript at 1876-77,1880). 
The jury convicted Mr. Menzies of capital murder. At the penalty phase, the State, in 
addition to the circumstances of Ms. Hunsaker's murder, put on aggravating evidence that 
detailed Mr. Menzies extensive criminal history, which included three armed robberies (in one, 
Mr. Menzies nearly blew off his victim's arm with a shotgun) and a prison escape. Mr. Menzies' 
trial counsel put on mental health mitigation evidence from two experts; family history evidence 
from Mr. Menzies' sister and aunt, detailing the abuse that Mr. Menzies suffered; testimony 
establishing Mr. Menzies' relative good behavior on his previous incarceration; and evidence 
from a former parole board member that, if sentenced to life, Mr. Menzies likely would spend 
the rest of his life in prison. (3/15-16/88; 3/17,18, 23/88; and 3/16/88 transcripts.) 
Mr. Menzies' direct appeal lasted another seven years, concluding nine years after the 
murder. It generated two opinions. State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 396 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 
513 U.S. 1115 (1995); State v. Menkes, 845 P.2d 220 (Utah 1992). 
Post-conviction proceedings. 
Beginning in April 1995, Mr. Menzies filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
and/or Post Conviction Relief (R. 1), an amended petition (R. 44), and a second amended 
petition (R. 1231). In all, the petitions raised seventy-three claims for post-conviction relief. 
The seventy-second raised seven separate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. 
From 1995 until 1998, four pro bono attorneys represented Mr. Menzies (R. 36,41). In 
6 
1998, after the state legislature provided funding for representation and expenses in capital post-
conviction cases, the post-conviction court appointed Edward Brass to represent Mr. Menzies 
(R. 1215). 
On February 2, 1999, the post-conviction court dismissed the first seventy-one claims. 
The court found that they were procedurally barred because Mr. Menzies had raised and lost 
them on direct appeal. (R. 1705 (addendum B).) 
Throughout the seven years of post-conviction litigation, Mr. Menzies provided no 
discovery without respondent having to file motions to compel and, at times, motions for 
sanctions. It took three tries and two motions to compel to complete Mr. Menzies' deposition. 
After repeated failures to comply with the orders compelling discovery, the post-conviction 
court entered sanctions that precluded Mr. Menzies from introducing any evidence supporting 
his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims beyond that disclosed in his discovery answers to that 
point and what was in the underlying criminal case record. (R. 1968,2093-2102 (addendum C).) 
Respondent then moved for summary judgment (R. 2110). Mr. Menzies did not respond. 
Nevertheless, the post-conviction court analyzed the remaining claims and denied them on their 
merits.4 On January 11, 2002, the post-conviction court entered final judgment denying post-
conviction relief. (R. 2237-61 (addendum D).)5 
4On some claims, the post-conviction court made alternative procedural bar rulings. 
throughout his brief, Mr. Menzies refers to the sanctions order and summary 
judgment as "default" orders. The label inaccurately suggests that the post-conviction court 
granted the sanctions and summary judgment motions because Mr. Brass filed no response. 
Although Mr. Menzies opposed neither motion, the post-conviction court analyzed and rule 
on the merits of both motions. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) proceedings. 
On April 11,2002, Mr. Menzies filed a two-sentence pleading denominated a motion to 
set aside judgment. The pleading indicated that he would state the "specific grounds" for the 
motion "in a subsequent memorandum.5' (R. 2271 (addendum E).) 
Although Mr. Menzies timely appealed the denial of post-conviction relief, he never filed 
his brief. This Court dismissed the appeal for his failure to do so. Throughout the entire ten 
months that the aborted appeal was pending, Mr. Menzies did not file any rule 60(b) 
memorandum and did nothing else to prosecute the motion to set aside the judgment.6 
Mr. Menzies waited until August 2003 to file a memorandum that purported to be in 
support of the two-sentence April 2002 pleading (R. 2322). 
After seven more months of litigation, which included an evidentiary hearing, the rule 
60(b) court denied relief (R 3701). Mr. Menzies timely appealed (R. 3913). 
6Mr. Menzies asserts that respondent "did not move to strike or seek a hearing on or 
otherwise resolve its motion to file late response (R. 2957). [Respondent] later claimed that 
Menzies' time to file for relief in federal court had run in June of 2003 (R. 2363)." 
Appellant's Brief at 4-5. The recitation distorts the facts to create a false impression that 
respondent somehow created a federal time-bar trap for him. Other than an unexplained 
record citation, Mr. Menzies fails to disclose that respondent repeatedly warned Mr. Brass 
and Mr. Menzies' present counsel that respondent believed the federal limitations periods 
were running. Those warnings commenced four months before the six-month limitations 
statute ran and ten months before the twelve-month statute ran. Far from creating a trap for 
Mr. Menzies, respondent's counsel went well beyond his ethical obligations to warn Mr. 
Menzies of the federal time-bar. (R. 2363, 4124 at 35-37, 57.) Moreover, respondent 
asserted in August 2003 that only one of two potentially applicable federal statutes had run, 
but also acknowledged that the other would not run for another four months. Mr. Menzies 
fails to disclose that respondent later declined to assert a defense based on the statute that 
ran in June 2003. Menkes v. Gakkta, case no. 2:03CV00902JC/KBM, Docket No. 8 
(respondent asks the Court to take judicial notice of this filed pleading pursuant to Utah R. 
Evid. 201.) 
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ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
I. T.S. v. State, precludes relief based on the violation of a state statutory right to the 
effective assistance of counsel when the client's negligent or intentional acts would make relief 
inequitable. The rule 60(b) court applied that principle to deny Mr. Menzies relief. If Mr. 
Menzies had a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel, Mr. Menzies has not 
demonstrated that the rule 60(b) court abused its discretion by correctly applying this Court's 
limitations on such a right. Mr. Menzies argues, in part, that the rule 60(b) court should not have 
applied that part of the T.S. reasoning. He did not make that argument to the rule 60(b) court, 
limiting this Court to a plain error review. Mr. Menzies has not acknowledge or argued the plain 
error standard. His authority does not demonstrate plain error. 
Mr. Menzies also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the rule 60(b) 
court's findings. Again, he did not make this argument below. Again, he has not argued or 
demonstrated plain error. In addition, he has not marshaled the evidence or demonstrated that 
the unchallenged evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings. 
II. Alternatively, the Court may affirm because the rule 60(b) court should not have 
applied T.S. to this case. Applying T.S. would render capital post-conviction cases interminable: 
each time a capital petitioner failed to succeed, he would file a new petition claiming ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel. The legislature did not intend to cause a de facto 
repeal of the death penalty by providing compensated counsel in capital post-conviction cases. 
The Court may also affirm because Mr. Menzies never proved that his post-conviction 
counsel was ineffective. Mr. Menzies has never proven or even attempted to prove prejudice. 
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III. Mr. Menzies argues that the rule 60(b) court should have granted him relief under 
rule 60(b)(1) based on his post-conviction counsel's negligence. Controlling precedent holds the 
contrary. Alternatively, Mr. Menzies did not seek rule 60(b)(1) relief timely. Because he stated 
no grounds for relief until nineteen months after the post-conviction judgment against him, he 
filed no "motion" to set that judgment aside until that time. The motion was sixteen months 
too late for rule 60(b)(1) relief. The Court may also affirm because Mr. Menzies never proved 
that he had a meritorious post-conviction claim. 
IV. Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from a "void" judgment. A due process violation 
renders a judgment "void" only when it deprives the court of the power to enter the judgment. 
The rule 60(b) court correctly concluded that Mr. Brass's deficient performance did not meet 
that standard and that Mr. Menzies established no other defect that would meet it. 
V. Rule 60(b)(5) permits relief from a judgment when: 1) it has prospective application; 
and 2) post-judgment events render the prospective application inequitable. Mr. Menzies has 
not demonstrated that the final post-conviction judgment applies prospectively: nothing about 
the post-conviction judgment remains executory or requires continued supervision by the post-
conviction court. In addition, he identifies no post-judgment facts that make the judgment's 
terms unfair. 
VI. If the Court grants relief, the Court should limit it to setting aside the summary 
judgment and discovery sanctions orders. Rule 60(b) permits setting aside a judgment on terms 
"that are just." If the Court reverses the denial of rule 60(b) relief, it should not return re-open 
the post-conviction case at its ten-year-old starting point. After the criminal proceedings 
10 
conclude, society has a strong interest in finality. In addition, Ms. Hunsaker's surviving family 
members have a right to the speedy resolution of the post-conviction proceedings. The 
undisputed evidence demonstrates that Mr. Menzies was abusing the discovery process 
personally. It would not be "just" to restart the post-conviction case. 
VII. To facilitate the rule 60(b) evidentiary hearing, the court permitted discovery. In 
that discovery, the rule 60(b) court ordered Mr. Menzies to disclose to respondent documents 
that Mr. Menzies claimed were privileged. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered 
respondent to return the documents and to destroy all working copies that respondent made. 
However, the court never expressly ruled that the documents were privileged. 
Mr. Menzies states that respondent has not complied with that order. Nothing in the 
record supports that accusation. Mr. Menzies also argues that the remedy was insufficient, and 
that this Court should order respondent to search its files, identify any copies of the disputed 
documents that he received from sources other than Mr. Menzies, and destroy those copies as 
well. Mr. Menzies affirmatively waived any challenge to the rule 60(b) court's procedures: the 
court followed the procedures Mr. Menzies suggested. In any event, Mr. Menzies cites no 
authority for the extraordinary relief he requests that this Court grant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RULE 60(b) COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT MR. 
MENZIES5 ACTS BARRED RELIEF 
Mr. Menzies sought relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l)(mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect) and (6)(any other reason justifying relief). In support, he argued that he 
should not be held responsible for Mr. Brass's deficient representation. Relying on this Court's 
11 
decision in TS. v. State, 82 P.3d 1104, 2003 UT 54 (R. 3740-41), the rule 60(b) court agreed.7 
However, also relying on T.S., the rule 60(b) court concluded that Mr. Menzies' acts made it 
inequitable to grant him relief. The court found that: 1) Mr. Men2ies knew or should have 
known that Mr. Brass was providing inadequate representation; 2) Mr. Menzies knew how to 
bring this problem to the post-conviction court's attention, but did not; and 3) by failing to bring 
the matter to the post-conviction court's attention, Mr. Menzies acquiesced in the case delay and 
was not entitled to relief from the post-conviction judgment against him. (R. 3740-51.) 
Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated that the rule 60(b) court erroneously held him 
accountable for his acts. He also has not demonstrated that the evidence was plainly insufficient 
to support the rule 60(b) court's findings. 
A. Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated that the rule 60(b) court erroneously concluded that 
his own acts barred relief from the post-conviction judgment. 
In T.S., this Court held that an indigent party's statutory right to appointed counsel in 
parental termination cases implied a right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at %l. 
However, the Court also held that "a party!s own negligent or intentional acts might render . . 
. relief inequitable, notwithstanding a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at *[[13. 
7The rule 60(b) court analyzed this issue under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (6) (R. 
3740-51, 3756-63). Respondent disagrees that 60(b)(1) applies. That section refers to 
excusable conduct. As detailed in the rule 60(b) court's decision and in this brief, this is not 
a case of excusable conduct. Moreover, as detailed in point II, Mr. Menzies did not seek 
timely relief under rule 60(b)(1). 
However, if this Court concludes that Mr. Menzies had a state statutory right to the 
effective assistance of appointed counsel, respondent agrees for purposes of this appeal only 
that the Court may assess that claim under rule 60(b)(6). Respondent reserves the right in 
future actions to argue that a litigant must pursue that claim in a separate post-conviction 
petition rather than through rule 60(b) relief. 
12 
The rule 60(b) court concluded that Mr. Menzies' acts made rule 60(b) relief inequitable.8 
The rule 60(b) court had broad discretion to decide whether to set aside the judgment, 
and this Court will reverse only if the rule 60(b) court abused it. See, e.g., Lund v. T>rown^ 11 P.3d 
277,2000 UT 75 ^ [9-10. An abuse occurs, for example, where the court founds its decision on 
flawed legal conclusions. Id. at ^|9. 
On appeal, Mr. Menzies argues that: 1) the rule 60(b) court improperly held him 
accountable for Mr. Brass's deficient representation; 2) the T.S. holding that his own negligent 
or intentional acts cannot apply to him because he could waive further post-conviction review 
only upon direct court inquiry; 3) the post-conviction court, not he, bore the burden of 
monitoring Mr. Brass's performance; and 4) requiring him to contact the post-conviction court 
directly about his appointed counsel's deficient performance conflicts with standard and sound 
practice. Appellant's Brief at 26-44. 
The first argument is frivolous. The rule 60(b) court repeatedly ruled that Mr. Menzies 
could not be held accountable for Mr. Brass's actions (R. 3742, 3750, 3766, and 3768). All of 
the facts on which the court relied in denying relief focused on why Mr. Menzies should have 
taken action and his failure to do so, not on Mr. Brass's failures. (R. 3740-51; point IB below.) 
In the second argument, Mr. Menzies reasons that holding him accountable for inaction 
equates to an improper presumed waiver of constitutional rights that a criminal defendant can 
waive only after a court has determined that he wishes to waive the right, and does so 
"'intelligently and understandably.'" Appellant's Brief at 27-28 (citations omitted). In essence, 
8As detailed in point II, T.S. should not apply to establish a right to the effective 
assistance of appointed capital post-conviction counsel. 
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Mr. Menzies argues that the rule 60(b) court relied on a flawed legal conclusion because the T.S. 
holding that his negligent or intentional acts may bar relief cannot apply to him. Instead, 
according to Mr. Menzies, the rule 60(b) court could deny relief for Mr. Brass's deficient 
performance only if the post-conviction court had brought Mr. Menzies into court sua sponte and 
determined that Mr. Menzies affirmatively wished to waive any further post-conviction review. 
Mr. Menzies never made this argument to the rule 60(b) court.9 Therefore, the Court 
may reverse only if Mr. Menzies establishes that the principle he argues was correct and was so 
well established that the rule 60(b) court should have recognized and applied it despite Mr. 
Menzies' failure to raise it. See, e.g., State v. Ke/Iy 61 P.3d 1019, 2002 UT 106 1J32 (Utah Supreme 
Court will review arguments raised for the first time on appeal only for plain error); State v. 
Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 403-405 (Utah 1994) (same), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995); State v. 
E/dredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah) (error not obvious where the appellate decision requiring the 
omitted action had not yet been decided), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Mr. Menzies has not 
acknowledged this standard or attempted to meet it. By itself, that failure defeats his claim. State 
v. Gulbransen, 106 P.3d 734, 2005 UT 7 ffl}46-48 (rejecting a constitutional claim first raised on 
appeal where Gulbransen did not argue plain error).10 
9On the T.S. negligence element, Mr. Menzies argued only that the record was 
undisputed that he had done nothing negligent or intentional that would bar relief (R. 3291). 
After taking evidence, the rule 60(b) court disagreed. 
10In a separate point, Mr. Menzies genetically asserts that, if he did not preserve any 
claims, the Court should address them under the plain error standard. Appellant's Brief at 
49. This blanket assertion without any claim-specific analysis fails to meet Mr. Menzies' 
obligation to support his claims with analysis and authority. See Utah R. App. P. 
24(a) (9) (requiring parties to provide supporting contentions and reasons for their arguments 
and to include the grounds for reviewing unpreserved issues); State v. Honie, 57 P.3d 977, 
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Mr. Menzies also cites no case that demonstrates obvious error. Mr. Menzies assumes 
without citation to any authority and without any analysis that the rule 60(b) court should have 
applied a waiver-of-rights analysis. Mr. Menzies confuses a failure to pursue a right with a 
"waiver" of that right. See Manning v. State, 89 P.3d 196, 2004 UT App 87 fflf23-28 (rejecting 
Manning's argument that she was entided to resentencing to resurrect her appeal unless the 
circumstances demonstrated a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right), cert, granted, 98 P.3d 
1177 (Utah Aug 11, 2004). Mr. Menzies' reasoning would require all courts, civil and criminal, 
trial and appellate, to hold a case open until a party fully litigated all issues or expressly told the 
court that he waived his right to proceed. No court could dismiss a case for lack of prosecution, 
as this Court did when Mr. Menzies failed to file his post-conviction appellate brief. Mr. 
Menzies demonstrates no error, let alone obvious error, for failing to apply the waiver-of-rights 
2002 UT 61 [^61 n.7 (declining to adopt a state constitutional rule where Honie had not 
demonstrated in "any meaningful way" why the Court should apply cited constitutional 
provisions to create the proposed rule), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 863. Mr. Menzies has asked this 
Court to craft his argument for him. As it has in the past, the Court should refuse to do so. 
Id. (cc[a]s we have repeatedly reminded, this court is not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research"); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 489 (Utah 1988) ("c[t]his Court will not engage in constructing arguments out of whole 
cloth on behalf of defendants in capital cases"') (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds, 
State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). 
Mr. Menzies also asks the Court to abandon the plain error requirement. Precedent 
that Mr. Menzies has not disclosed, including the opinion from his direct appeal, forecloses 
this argument. Even on direct, mandatory review in a death case, this Court will reverse on 
unpreserved issues only if the capital defendant establishes plain error. See, e.g., State v. Kell 
and State v. Menkes cited in the text. Mr. Menzies offers no reasoned basis for applying plain 
error in mandatory direct review in a death case, but not in review of the denial of relief from 
a judgment denying collateral relief. If Mr. Menzies intends to argue that this Court should 
abandon its well-established precedent applying plain error in all death cases, he has a 
"substantial burden of persuasion" to justify doing so. State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d at 398. Mr. 
Menzies has not acknowledged the precedent, acknowledged the burden he bears to overturn 
it, or attempted to meet it. 
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rule to this case. 
Mr. Menzies relies solely on cases discussing a criminal defendant's waiver of 
constitutional rights. Appellant's Brief at 28 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) 
(criminal defendant's waiver counsel), and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 516 (1972) (criminal 
defendant's waiver of speedy trial tight)). Utah post-conviction proceedings are civil. See, e.g., 
Maxwell v. Turner, 435 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1967) (habeas petition challenging a guilty plea is 
"civil in nature"); Burleigh v. Turner, 388 P.2d 412,414 (Utah 1964) (habeas is a civil remedy). Mr. 
Menzies cites no authority for the proposition that the same waiver standards apply in civil 
proceedings.11 
The sum of Mr. Menzies' argument is his unsupported conclusion that the civil cases on 
which the rule 60(b) court relied "do not control in a quasi-criminal capital case such as this." 
Appellant's Brief at 29. Mr. Menzies relies only on a "Cf." cite to this Court's opinion in Sims 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992). Id. at n.67. 
Sims does not establish that the rule 60(b) court should have rejected the well-established 
precedent that Utah post-conviction proceedings are civil, recognized the case as "quasi-
11Even in a criminal case, the law does not require an in-court inquiry into every 
waiver. For example, a criminal defendant who does not file a timely motion to suppress 
evidence will waive his opportunity to vindicate the violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1). The trial court does not have to call the defendant into 
court and determine that he intentionally did not file the motion. Similarly, a criminal 
defendant who does not preserve his constitutional claims in the trial court will have his state 
constitutional right to appellate review limited to plain error review, and will lose the right to 
appellate review altogether if he fails to argue plain error. State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 
^[46-48. Applying those rules does not require this Court to bring the criminal appellant 
into court and engage him in a colloquy to determine that he intentionally or knowingly 
failed to preserve the constitutional claim in the trial court, or that he intentionally or 
knowingly concluded not to argue plain error on appeal. 
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criminal," and then conclude that the case's new "quasi-criminal" designation precluded applying 
the part of T.S. that would hold Mr. Menzies accountable for his acts. Sims was not a post-
conviction case and certainly did not hold that post-conviction cases are "quasi-criminal."12 
Under Sims, an action that the legislature labels "civil" becomes "quasi-criminal," affording to 
the defendant the rights that a criminal defendant would enjoy, only 1) when the action seeks 
to deter and punish criminal activity; and 2) where the proof is "inextricably connected with 
proof of criminal activity." Id. at 13-14.13 Mr. Menzies has not argued that a post-conviction 
case, where he proceeds against the State and where the State does not have to prove criminal 
activity, so clearly satisfies this criteria that the post-conviction court should have considered his 
post-conviction action "quasi-criminal" and refused to apply the T.S. negligence element to 
him.14 
12When, over eleven years ago, one former justice of this Court stated that 
characterizing post-conviction cases as "civil" was a "fiction," only one other justice joined. 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 530 (Utah) (Zimmerman, CJ., with Durham, J., concurring), 
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). Respondent could find no case that characterized Utah post-
conviction cases as "criminal" or "quasi-criminal," and Mr. Menzies cites none. 
13In Sims, a state agency commenced a statutory civil action to recover a $400,000 tax 
assessment and penalty from Sims because the illegal drugs seized from his car did not bear 
the statutorily required tax stamp. Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d at 7. 
14Mr. Menzies also cites a Fourth Circuit case that he states "survey[s] federal 
decisions regarding the hybrid nature of habeas cases." Appellant's Brief at 29 n.67 (quoting 
O'Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 504-507 (4th Cir. 2005)). This citation also establishes no 
obvious error. First, how a federal intermediate appellate court characterizes federal habeas 
actions does not constitute clearly controlling precedent defining Utah post-conviction 
actions as "quasi-criminal." See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36 (Utah) (error not obvious 
where the appellate decision requiring the omitted action had not yet been decided). Second, 
nothing in O'Brien suggests that "hybrid" equates to "quasi-criminal": a term of art in both 
Utah and federal jurisprudence applied only to actions that meet certain criteria. One 1958 
Plymouth v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 70 (1965) (finding forfeiture proceeding 
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Mr. Menzies next argues that holding him responsible for his own negligence "is flatly 
at legal odds with the Utah legislative scheme for indigent capital post-conviction cases, which 
puts the burden squarely on the shoulders of the trial court to appoint qualified lawyers and to 
remove appointed lawyers who are not functioning as they should?* Appellant's Brief at 30 (emphasis 
added). Again, Mr. Menzies did not make this argument below and has not argued plain error 
on appeal. Again, Mr. Menzies' authority does not demonstrate obvious error. 
Mr. Menzies relies on Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (West 2004), Utah R. Crim. P. 8, 
and Utah Administrative Code 25-14-6. Section 202 required the post-conviction court to 
appoint qualified counsel. Rule 8(e) delineates the necessary qualifications.15 Administrative 
Code Section 25-14-6 allows the Division of Finance to recover fees it has paid when a capital 
post-conviction attorney is removed due to "misconduct" or a conflict that he should have 
disclosed prior to the appointment. None of the above "squarely" or otherwise requires a post-
conviction court to monitor whether counsel is providing adequate representation and remove 
them if they are not.16 
initiated by the government against an automobile because it was used to commit a crime was 
"quasi-criminal," entitling the owner to the benefit of the suppression rule, because its object 
was to punish the owner for the committing a crime); Sims v. State Tax Comm'n^ 814 P.2d at 
13-14. 
15As established in point IV, the post-conviction court appointed counsel with rule 
8(e) qualifications. 
16Mr. Menzies complains that the post-conviction court and respondent "must have 
known" that Mr. Brass's representation was substandard. Again, Mr. Menzies never argued 
this as a circumstance that foreclosed applying the T.S. lack-of-negligence element to him. 
Moreover, the post-conviction court and respondent knew only that Mr. Brass did not 
complete discovery and filed no opposition to respondent's sanctions and summary 
judgment motions. It was not until the rule 60(b) proceedings that Mr. Brass made clear that 
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Finally, Mr. Menzies contends that the rule 60(b) court erroneously found him liable for 
his failure to contact the post-conviction court about his case's obvious failure to progress. He 
asserts that the ruling "conflicts with sound and standard practice, wherein trial courts routinely 
forbid represented people to communicate directly with the courts." Appellant's Brief at 31. 
The argument misstates Utah law. Utah law not only permits indigent represented 
persons to complain directly to the court about appointed counsel's performance, it mandates 
that the court address the concerns. See State v. Lovell, 984 P.2d 382, 1999 UT 40 |^27 (when a 
defendant '"expresses dissatisfaction with counsel,'" "the trial courts in all cases should conduct 
specific inquiry") (citing State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1987)), cert, denied, 528 
U.S. 1083. 
B. Mr. Menzies has not argued or demonstrated that the evidence was plainly insufficient 
to hold him accountable for his negligent and intentional acts. 
Mr. Menzies asserts that the rule 60(b) court's denial of relief "hinges" on inadequate and 
clearly erroneous factual findings. Appellant's Brief at 32-44. Mr. Menzies did not make this 
argument to the rule 60(b) court. Consequently, he may succeed only if he demonstrates plain 
error. See State v. Ho/gate, 10 P.3d 346, 2000 UT 74 ffi[ll-19 (Court will review unpreserved 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for plain error only). He has not acknowledged this 
he had no legitimate basis for his failures. At the time they occurred, an equally supportable 
inference was that Mr. Brass had reviewed the remaining claims, consulted with Mr. Menzies, 
concluded that the remaining claims had no legal or factual support, and concluded that he 
could buy Mr. Menzies some more time by requiring respondent to proceed through the 
necessary steps to bring the post-conviction case to a close. 
Although Mr. Menzies faults everyone else for failing to monitor his case and take 
action on his behalf, he has drawn the line at faulting this Court for failing to remove Mr. 
Brass even though Mr. Brass never filed a post-conviction appellate brief. 
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standard, let alone attempted to meet it. The claim fails for that reason alone. State v. Gulbransen, 
2005 UT 7 ffi[46-48. 
Alternatively, Mr. Men2ies has not demonstrated plain error. To succeed on a sufficiency 
challenge, Mr. Menzies must "combQ the record for and compil[e] all die evidence" that 
supports the rule 60(b) court's finding that Mr. Menzies' negligent and intentional acts precluded 
60(b) relief. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. FradanManufacturing Corp., 54 P.3d 1177,2002 UT 94^21; Cfe/z 
v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 2004 UT 82 [^20 (appellant must marshal the evidence "if a 
determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-
sensitive"). He "'must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] resists.'" Chen v. Stewart, 2004 
UT 82 \J7 (citation omitted). He must '"temporarily remove [his] own prejudices and fully 
embrace [respondent's] position'; he .. . must play the "devil's advocate.'"" Id. at {^78 (citation 
omitted). Then, he must demonstrate that the marshaled evidence was legally insufficient to 
support the challenged finding. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Manufacturing Corp., 2002 UT 94 *[[21. 
Mr. Menzies has not fulfilled this obligation. First, he has not presented the "precisely 
focused," devil's advocate summary that the law requires. Instead, he co-mingles favorable and 
unfavorable evidence to argue that the rule 60(b) court's findings were unsupported. Appellant's 
Brief at 32-44.17 
17Mr. Menzies also has not gathered "every scrap" of evidence supporting the rule 
60(b) court's findings. The court found that Mr. Menzies had no equitable claim to relief; 
other evidence supported that conclusion. For example, despite Mr. Brass's advice that Mr. 
Menzies should proceed with his deposition, he twice refused to do so (R. 1971-72; 4125 at 
77-78). Mr. Menzies asserted that his reasons changed over time; however, he conceded, 
"But at times, to be perfectly honest with you, I didn't want to give — talk to you bastards 
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Mr. Menzies also has not demonstrated that the evidence was obviously legally 
insufficient to support the rule 60(b) court's ruling that his acts barred relief. Wilson Supply, Inc. 
v, Fradan Manufacturing Corp., 2002 UT 94 ^21. In denying relief, the rule 60(b) court relied, in 
part, on the following: 1) Mr. Menzies told Mr. Brass that he was innocent, and Mr. Menzies was 
personally aware that delay could have severe consequences to the post-conviction outcome; 2) 
after Mr. Brass's appointment, Mr. Menzies stopped receiving copies of documents; 3) 
throughout Mr. Brass's representation, Mr. Menzies made "literally" hundreds of calls to Mr. 
Brass, but spoke to Mr. Brass or a staff member on only a handful of occasions; 4) Mr. Menzies' 
letters and journal entries express frustration about Mr. Brass not hiring an investigator or 
experts; 5) the letters and journal entries express frustration with his inability to contact Mr. 
Brass; 6) when Mr. Lynn Donaldson substituted for Mr. Brass at a court hearing, Mr. Menzies 
complained to Mr. Donaldson about the substitution; 7) Mr. Menzies first learned of the 
November 5,1999, deposition on that day; 8) Mr. Brass sent a substitute attorney to cover the 
that's trying to kill me" (R. 4126 at 190). His refusals necessitated two motions to compel 
the deposition and contributed to approximately one year of delay (R. 2093-99). The 
undisputed evidence also demonstrates that Mr. Menzies withheld discoverable information, 
both during his deposition and in his written discovery responses (R. 4126 at 180-90 
(addendum F)). He asserted no privilege that would have alerted respondent that he was 
withholding the information. 
Mr. Menzies also distorts some of the evidence. For example, he suggests that he 
kept Mr. Brass because no one else was available to represent him. Appellant's Brief at 43. 
For sole support that no one else was available, he relies on evidence that he never presented 
to the rule 60(b) court Appellant's Brief at 4, citing R. 4135. Respondent has moved to 
strike that transcript More importantly, he ignores his own testimony that he knew that 
there were other qualified lawyers, but he did not think that "the ones that would do it [were] 
very swift" (R. 4126 at 168). Far from the portrait Mr. Menzies paints of a helpless inmate at 
his attorney's mercy, Mr. Menzies knew he had options and took a calculated risk to stay with 
the attorney whom he knew was not pushing his case forward because he preferred that 
attorney to the alternatives. 
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deposition; 9) there were no court hearings from the beginning of 1999 through 2002;1910) Mr. 
Menzies complained to Mr. Lynn Donaldson, Mr. Richard Uday, and Ms. Amy Donaldson 
about Mr. Brass's lack of communication, his "ineffective" representation, and the lack of case 
progress;20 11) Mr. Menzies has a certificate of completion in basic paralegal skills; 12) Mr. 
Menzies knew that he could contact the court and had done so in the past; 13) during the four 
years that Mr. Brass represented Mr. Menzies prior to the summary judgment, Mr. Menzies did 
not notify the post-conviction court about the delay in his case; 14) Mr. Menzies had obtained 
court dockets from other attorneys in the past; and 15) despite his concerns, Mr. Menzies kept 
Mr. Brass as his attorney, which the rule 60(b) court concluded amounted to an intentional 
acquiescence in the delay. (R. 3744-50.)21 
18Mr. Menzies states that the rule 60(b) court "noted . . . that Menzies knew that Brass 
did not . . . give him notice of the first deposition attended by the unqualified substitute 
lawyer." Appellant's Brief at 42. The rule 60(b) court "noted" nothing about the substitute 
attorney's qualifications. 
19Mr. Menzies faults the accuracy of this finding only because the period actually 
spanned from December 1998 to August 2003. 
20Mr. Menzies faults the finding's accuracy only for referring to Ms. Donaldson as an 
attorney; she is not. Appellant's Brief at 38. 
21Mr. Menzies challenges the rule 60(b) court's characterization that he intentionally 
acquiesced in the delay. He contends that it is clearly erroneous because Mr. Brass was 
misleading him about the case status. Appellant's Brief at 33-35. Mr. Menzies misstates the 
rule 60(b) court's reasoning. Mr. Brass did not begin misleading Mr. Menzies about the case 
status until after the judgment had been entered (R. 4125 at 92-93). The court relied on Mr. 
Menzies' pre-judgment failures to act despite his awareness of Mr. Brass's deficient 
representation to find that Mr. Menzies intentionally acquiesced in the delay. Moreover, as 
demonstrated in footnote 16, Mr. Menzies' testimony demonstrates that he chose to keep 
Mr. Brass despite the delays because he preferred Mr. Brass to the alternative counsel 
available; that choice was an intentional acquiescence in the delay. 
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Mr. Menzies has not challenged the accuracy of these facts in any material way. He also 
has not argued how they fail as a matter of law to support the court's conclusion that, under 
T.S., Mr. Menzies5 acts and omissions precluded relief because he knew the importance of 
proceeding expeditiously, knew that Mr. Brass was not proceeding expeditiously, and knew how 
to contact the post-conviction court about the problem, but did not. Instead, he contends that 
they fail to support finding that he intentionally and knowingly waived his rights, and that they 
do not support holding him accountable for Mr. Brass's negligence. Appellant's Brief at 42-43. 
As established in point IA, Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated that the rule 60(b) court should 
have applied a waiver-of-rights analysis, and the rule 60(b) court did not hold him accountable 
for Mr. Brass's negligence. 
Mr. Menzies also complains that many of the findings are incomplete because they 
allegedly fail to take into account other evidence and argues that some are clearly erroneous. 
The Court need not resolve whether Mr. Menzies has met his burden to challenge those 
findings. Mr. Menzies has not argued that the allegedly erroneous findings render the rule 60(b) 
court's conclusion legally insupportable in light of the facts that he has not challenged or in light 
of the facts that he has not marshaled. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg Corp., 2002 UT 94 ^ [21,22 
22Mr. Menzies' argument that some findings are "incomplete" assumes that the rule 
60(b) court failed to take into account any evidence that it did not specifically address. He 
cites no support for that assumption. Absent a clear statement to the contrary, the Court 
must assume that the rule 60(b) court took the evidence into account, but found it 
unpersuasive. See State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, 942 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah 
1997) (the Court must resolve all disputes in the light most favorable to the lower court's 
determination), cert, denied, Utah v. Cannon, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000). 
Moreover, Mr. Menzies merely argues that the rule 60(b) court should have drawn the 
inferences from the evidence in his favor. For example, Mr. Menzies argues that the court 
did not take into account 1) Mr. Brass's testimony that Mr. Menzies complained about 
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In sum, Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated that the rule 60(b) court erroneously held him 
accountable for his negligent and intentional acts. 
II. THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM ON THE ALTERNATIVE BASES THAT THE 
RULE 60(B) COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED T.S. TO THIS CASE, 
AND, EVEN IF T.S. SHOULD APPLY, MR. MENZIES NEVER PROVED 
THAT HIS POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
The Court may affirm the denial of relief on any legitimate ground, including any ground 
that the lower court considered but rejected. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 2002 UT 58 
TJ10 (the Court may affirm the outcome on any "legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record'") (citation omitted), State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996) (the Court may affirm the 
outcome on a theory that the lower court considered and rejected). 
A. The Court should not create a statutory right to the effective assistance of capital post-
conviction counsel. 
As stated above, T.S. recognized a statutory right to the effective assistance of appointed 
counsel in parental termination cases. That holding makes a poor fit in post-conviction cases. 
First, the statute providing for appointed counsel in parental termination cases included no 
memory problems and reported taking medication to treat depression, 2) Mr. Menzies was 
influenced to keep Mr. Brass due to the lack of a viable alternative and 3) testimony that 
three criminal defense attorneys told Mr. Menzies to keep Mr. Brass, who ultimately would 
provide excellent representation. Appellant's Brief at 39 and 43. The Court may not reverse 
on Mr. Menzies5 invitation to draw the inferences in his favor. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82 
[^78 (an appellant does not meet the marshaling requirement when he "simply restate [s] or 
review[s] evidence that points to an alternate finding or a finding contrary to the trial court's 
finding of fact"). Mr. Menzies cites no authority that, as a matter of law, 1) the rule 60(b) 
court had to except as accurate Mr. Brass's hearsay account of Mr. Menzies' report of 
memory problems; 2) the court had to accept as accurate Mr. Menzies' testimony that he 
kept Brass due to the lack of a "viable" alternative; or 3) the court had to conclude that it was 
reasonable for Mr. Menzies to rely on conversations with persons not his attorneys advising 
him to keep Mr. Brass rather than bring his concerns to the post-conviction court's attention. 
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language defining the expectations for counsel's representation. Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-319 
(2002). This left a blank slate on which to write an "effective assistance" requirement. By 
contrast, section 78-35a-202 requires courts to appoint counsel who "is qualified to represent 
defendants in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure." Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-202(2)(a) (Supp. 2001). This language expresses anintent 
to minimize the risk of deficient representation by providing qualified and compensated counsel; 
not an intent to insure against that risk by creating a right to effective representation. 
Second, T.S. created the right to effective representation at a stage where the State was 
proceeding against a party to terminate the relationship between a parent and child. The Sixth 
Amendment guaranteed to Mr. Menzies the same right in the criminal proceedings when the 
State proceeded against him to take away his life. However, at this stage, Mr. Menzies is 
proceeding against the State to challenge his presumptively valid conviction and sentence. The 
legislature properly limited the provision of counsel to compensation and minimum 
qualifications without guaranteeing counsel whose representation in the civil action against the 
State again satisfied Sixth Amendment standards. 
Finally, writing an effective assistance requirement into section 202 would make capital 
post-conviction litigation interminable and end the finality of death sentences. A capital post-
conviction petitioner who failed to obtain relief on his first state petition could file a second 
petition challenging his prior post-conviction counsel's effectiveness. If he failed, he could file 
another petition challenging post-post-conviction counsel's effectiveness, and so on.23 The 
lzCf.} e.g., Bonin v. Vasque^ 999 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Or. 1993) (refusing to recognize a 
federal constitutional right to state post-conviction counsel, even when state post-conviction 
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legislature did not intend to create unending state post-conviction review and render death 
sentences incapable of execution. 
B. Mr. Menzies affirmatively waived any claim that he has a constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel; alternatively, he has not established that 
any such right obviously existed. 
Mr. Menzies also argues that he has a state and federal constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of state post-conviction counsel. Mr. Menzies affirmatively waived this argument. 
Mr. Menzies raised part of the argument in a memorandum that the rule 60(b) court struck as 
untimely (R. 3694-96). Mr. Menzies attempted to raise that part again and raised the rest of the 
argument in point IV of his T.S. memorandum (R. 3296-99). Later, Mr. Menzies agreed that the 
rule 60(b) court would not have to resolve respondent's motion to strike point IV as untimely 
because the rule 60(b) court said that it would not rely on the constitutional argument (R. 3694-
96). Thus, Mr. Menzies induced the lower court not to resolve the argument he presses on 
appeal. Mr. Menzies' waiver bars review even under a plain error standard. See, e.g, State v. 
bullock, 791 P.2d 155,158-59 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). 
At most, the Court could review the argument for plain error: Mr. Menzies never made 
the arguments timely. The argument still fails because Mr. Menzies has not argued plain error. 
State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 ^ [46-48. His authority does not satisfy that burden. Mr. Menzies 
argues that Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), recognized a possible federal constitutional 
provides the first opportunity to litigate trial counsel's effectiveness, because the right likely 
would result in "an infinite continuum of litigation"); Breard v. Netherlands 949 F. Supp. 1255, 
1266 (E.D. Va) (recognizing a federally protected right to state post-conviction counsel 
would create a similar right at every stage because each new pleading presents the first 
opportunity to challenge prior counsel's effectiveness), affirmed, Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 
(4th Cir.), cert, denied, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). 
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right to the effective assistance of state post-conviction counsel when state post-conviction 
provides the first opportunity to challenge trial and appellate counsel's effectiveness. Appellant's 
Brief at 17-18. Mr. Menzies distorts Coleman. The Supreme Court applied its well-established 
precedent rejecting the right Mr. Menzies claims and refused to recognize the exception he 
argues. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 755-57. Several courts have since followed suit.24 What 
the controlling precedent makes obvious is that there exists no federal constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of state post-conviction counsel.25 
Mr. Menzies also argues that "many provisions" of Utah's constitution "broadly 
supportQ" a right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Appellant's Brief at 16-
17. Again, he cites no clearly controlling authority that such a right exists; his laundry list of 
constitutional provisions that he claims would support recognizing that right demonstrate no 
plain error. See State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 36 (Utah) (no plain error where legal precedent was 
2AMartine% p. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 240 (5th Or. 2001) (precedent precludes 
considering whether an exception exists "under the Coleman rule"), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1163 
(2002); Mackallv. Angelone, 131 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Or. 1997) (rejecting argument that Coleman 
recognizes a loophole because Coleman did not adopt the exception to the prior precedent), 
cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1100 (1998); Rill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015,1025-26 (11th Or. 1996) (no right 
to the effective assistance of state post-conviction counsel even when post-conviction 
presents the first opportunity to challenge trial counsel's effectiveness), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 
1119 (1997); Bonin v. Vasque^ 999 F.2d at 429-30 (refusing to recognize an exception, in part 
because doing so likely would cause an "infinite continuum" of litigation); Breard v. 
Netherland, 949 F. Supp. at 1265-66 (same). 
25Mr. Menzies also suggests that his federal right to court access and equal protection 
require recognizing a federally protected right to the effective assistance of state post-
conviction counsel. Appellant's Brief at 18-19. As demonstrated in the text, the controlling 
federal precedent holds that no such right exists. Mr. Menzies also fails to disclose that this 
Court has rejected his court-access argument, let alone offering any reason to overturn that 
precedent. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 530. 
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not decided at the time of the district court decision).26 
C. The Court may also affirm on the alternative ground that Mr. Menzies never established 
that Mr. Brass was ineffective. 
In T.S., this Court relied on State ex relE.H. v. AM., 880 P.2d 11 (Utah App.), cert denied, 
890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994). T.S v. State, 2003 UT 54 f!- Under EM., Mr. Menzies must prove 
both deficient performance and that the deficient performance prejudiced his case. State ex rel 
EM v. AM, 880 P.2d at 13 (adopting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as the 
standard for proving the denial of a state statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel). 
Respondent concedes that, as to the seven ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Mr. 
Brass performed deficiently. However, Mr. Menzies failed to prove prejudice as to any of his 
post-conviction claims. Instead, he asks the Court to presume prejudice. Appellant's Brief at 
26Mr. Menzies relies on Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945). Harris says 
nothing about providing counsel who meet Sixth Amendment standards. Moreover, as 
detailed on point IV, Harris describes what due process guarantees when the State proceeds 
against a criminal defendant to take away his liberty. That proceeding ended for Mr. Menzies 
nearly seventeen years ago. 
Mr. Menzies arguments amount to nothing more than an assertion that it would be a 
good idea to recognize the right and providing a list of state constitutional provisions that 
Mr. Menzies claims would support it. The Court has already rejected similar arguments as 
inadequately briefed. State v. Honie, 2002 UT 61 [^61 n.7 (declining to adopt a state 
constitutional rule where Honie had not demonstrated in "any meaningful way" why the 
Court should apply cited constitutional provisions to create the proposed rule). For the 
reasons argued in the text, recognizing a right to the effective assistance of counsel would not 
be good policy; it would create unending capital state post-conviction litigation. Mr. 
Menzies' arguments also rely on flawed assumptions. For example, he asserts that the open 
courts provision necessitates providing effective representation due the "complicated 
procedural and substantive lawyering that is required in capital post-conviction cases." 
Appellant's Brief at 17. Similarly, he asserts that providing counsel will "insure the enduring 
effectiveness" of post-conviction review in capital cases. Id. at 16. However, the same 
procedural and substantive law applies in all collateral challenges to criminal convictions; not 
just capital cases. 
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20. For support, he relies on three federal cases. Appellant's Brief at 20 and n.42. All three 
dealt with the federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during criminal 
proceedings. The federal courts have refused to recognize a similar right in state post-conviction 
proceedings. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 755 (1991) (Coleman had no Sixth 
Amendment right to post conviction counsel). If Mr. Menzies has a state statutory right to the 
effective assistance of counsel, E.H. requires him to prove prejudice; it says nothing about 
presuming prejudice. Mr. Menzies provides no analysis or authority for incorporating the 
presumed-prejudice components of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence into a state statutory 
"effective assistance" right.27 
Mr. Menzies also misstates the prejudice standard that he would have to satisfy. He 
suggests that he can prove prejudice merely by showing that, if Mr. Brass had opposed the 
motions at issue, the post-conviction court would not have granted them. Appellant's Brief at 
27Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated that this case parallels the situations where the 
federal courts presume prejudice. Two of the cases presume prejudice when counsel fails to 
file an appeal notice because the failure forfeits the entire appellate proceeding. Appellant's 
Brief at 20 n.42. Mr. Brass did not forfeit the entire post-conviction proceeding by failing to 
file a petition in the first place. The third case presumes prejudice when counsel entirely fails 
to subject the State's case to any meaningful adversarial testing. Here, the State had no case 
to subject to adversarial testing; Mr. Menzies, not the State, was the plaintiff. In any event, 
that exception applies only when the failure is "entire]]"; the exception will not apply for 
failing to oppose the state at specific points in the proceedings. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 
696-97 (2002). The extensive litigation that preceded Mr. Brass's appointment by itself 
precludes finding an entire failure to prosecute this case. Moreover, Mr. Brass's performance 
was not a "complete failure" to act. Mr. Brass obtained the file, reviewed it, filed a second 
amended petition adding claims, and concluded that Mr. Menzies would be better off in 
federal court. He misunderstood that failing to litigate the ineffective assistance claims in 
state court would forfeit federal review of those claims. (R. 1231, 4126 at 138-39.) That 
error, although deficient, cannot be characterized as a "complete failure" to act on Mr. 
Menzies' behalf. 
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19-20.28 However, Mr. Menzies must prove that, absent Mr. Brass's deficient performance, there 
is a reasonable probability that the post-conviction court would have granted post-conviction 
relief, not merely that he could have won on discrete pre-judgment motions. State ex relE.H. 
v. A.H., 880 P.2d at 13-14.29 Mr. Menzies has never attempted to establish prejudice. That 
failure alone precludes granting relief. 
Moreover, this case illustrates why Mr. Menzies must prove prejudice. Mr. Menzies 
clearly could not have avoided dismissal or summary judgment on his first seventy-one claims. 
The post-conviction court dismissed those claims because Mr. Menzies raised and lost them on 
direct appeal. That procedural bar is absolute. Carter v. Galetka, AA P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96 Tf6. 
As to theineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel-claims, this Court has already recognized 
that Mr. Menzies' trial counsel's effectiveness "is in significant part a question of behavior 
observable from the record " Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n. v. Uno, 932 P 2d 589, 592 (Utah 
1997). Mr. Menzies had access to that record; under this Court's reasoning, he had access to the 
major tool to demonstrate that his ineffective assistance claims were reasonably likely to succeed. 
He did not do so. 
Moreover, the post-conviction court's summary judgment analysis demonstrates that, 
28Mr. Menzies has not proven prejudice even under his standard. He asserts that he 
met that standard because he asked his counsel to investigate his case. Appellant's Brief at 
20. Even the most complete investigation may not have produced sufficient evidence to 
withstand summary judgment. 
29Cf also Ysmmelman v. Morrison, All U.S. 365 (1986). Morrison claimed that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and timely move to suppress seized evidence. 
The Supreme Court held that the prejudice inquiry was "whether a reasonable probability 
exists that the trial judge would have had a reasonable doubt concerning respondent's guiltif the 
[seized evidence] and related testimony had been excluded." Id. at 389 (emphasis added). 
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even if Mr. Menzies could have provided additional evidence to support his ineffective-
assistance claims if Mr. Brass had investigated them beyond the record, they still would have 
failed as a matter of law (R. 2240-52, 2258).30 Mr. Menzies has never attempted to demonstrate 
the contrary. 
Finally, some of the claims are frivolous. For example, Mr. Menzies claimed that his trial 
counsel insufficiently investigated evidence that would establish that someone else murdered Ms. 
Hunsaker (R. 2254). However, Mr. Menzies conceded that he had no specific information that 
would identify someone else as the killer; he relied only on a bare assertion that "if [trial counsel] 
had done a reasonable investigation I'm sure they would have found out who it was" (R. 2789).31 
Presuming prejudice to set aside a judgment and allow further litigation on claims that have no 
reasonable probability of succeeding will serve no purpose other than unjustified delay.32 
30For example, Mr. Menzies claimed that his counsel failed to develop impeachment 
evidence that Walter Britton's testimony that Mr. Menzies confessed to him tracked 
information available in the general media. The post-conviction court concluded that, even 
if trial counsel could have proven that Mr. Britton's testimony actually tracked media 
accounts, he could not prove that it would have affected the outcome. The post-conviction 
court reasoned that trial counsel argued without contradiction that Mr. Britton's testimony 
tracked media accounts, yet the jury convicted Mr. Menzies anyway. The post-conviction 
court further reasoned that, even if Mr. Britton had not testified at all, there would be no 
reasonable likelihood of an acquittal because the state produced overwhelming independent 
evidence of Mr. Menzies' guilt. (R. 2249-51.) 
31Respondent recognizes that Mr. Menzies gave a more detailed version of this claim 
to his prior investigator (R. 184). However, he has succeeded in excluding that information 
from this record (R. 3899). The only record evidence concerning this claims demonstrates 
that it is frivolous. 
32Mr. Menzies also appears to argue that this Court has boundless authority to reverse 
the denial of rule 60(b) relief. He relies on "flexibility" in "capital habeas case[s]," the court's 
"supervisory powers," and the "standard practice of granting relief from default judgments." 
Appellant's Brief at 49-50. This appeal is not a habeas appeal; it is an appeal denying relief 
31 
III. MR. BRASS'S DEFICIENT REPRESENTATION DOES NOT JUSTIFY 
RULE 60(b)(1) RELIEF 
A. Rule 60(b)(1) does not hold a client harmless for his attorney's negligence. 
Rule 60(b)(1) permits relief from a judgment if a party proves "mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect." Mr. Menzies argues that, independent of any statutory right to 
the effective assistance of counsel, Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) permits relief when a party relies on 
his attorney and his attorney was inexcusably negligent. In essence, he argues that rule 60(b)(1) 
holds the parties harmless for their attorney's errors. This Court has already rejected that 
argument: "any neglect by [defendant's] attorney is attributable to [defendant] through principles 
of agency." See Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). See also Federal Fin. Co. v. 
Ranchita, 2000 UT App 56, 2000 WL 33249387 (addendum G). 
Mr. Menzies' authority does not establish the contrary. Mr. Menzies asserts that, in 
from judgment. Moreover, Mr. Menzies' mischaracterizes the scope of habeas relief. He 
cites solely to federal authority, but ignores that federal habeas relief is subject to strict 
procedural limitations. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding that 
Coleman was barred from federal habeas review of claims first raised in state post-conviction 
because he defaulted the state appeal by filing an appeal notice one day late). Mr. Menzies 
cites no authority for this Court using its supervisory authority to ignore the usual limitations 
on rule 60(b) relief. See State v. Home, 2002 UT 61 [^61 n.7 (declining Honie's invitation to 
adopt a state constitutional rule where Horde provided no meaningful analysis for doing so). 
Finally, the "standard practice" of setting aside default judgments does not apply. As 
explained in footnote 5, this is not a default judgment Moreover, the "standard practice" 
applies only if Mr. Menzies demonstrates his entitlement to rule 60(b) relief. For the reasons 
argued, he has not. 
Mr. Menzies also argues that the unopposed summary judgment and sanctions orders 
"effectively circumvented" his right to habeas corpus and violated his rights to equal 
protection because he is "receiving a radically different application of the laws than all other 
indigent capital defendants." Appellant's Brief at 21-23. In essence, he argues that a post-
conviction court can never grant relief on an unopposed motion. He cites ao authority to 
support that proposition. 
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Interstate Excavating Inc, v, Agla Development Cop,, 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), this Court held that 
the "trial court should have granted relief under 60(b)(1) after learning that default entered 
because defendant's lawyer did not give him notice of trial date and withdrew, and upon learning 
this, defendant immediately sought relief." Appellant's Brief at 24 n.53. Mr. Menzies 
mischaracterizes Interstate, In that case, the defendant's lawyer certified that he mailed to 
defendant notice of the trial date and notice that he had withdrawn. Defendant asserted that he 
received neither notice. However, defendant did not assert that his former attorney never sent 
it; he alleged only that it may have been lost in other papers that the attorney sent. Id, at 370. 
This Court did not find that defendant's counsel in fact failed to send the trial date notice or 
inform the defendant that he had withdrawn, let alone rely on the unfound failure as a reason 
to set aside the judgment.33 
33Mr. Menzies also relies on Uncoln Benefit Life Ins, Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 
P.2d 672, 675 (Utah App. 1992) and Yapp v. Excel Corp,, 186 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1999). 
First, neither the court of appeals nor the Tenth Circuit trumps this Court's precedent in 
Martel. Second, neither case supports concluding that the rule 60(b) court should have 
granted Mr. Menzies relief. Lincoln held only that, when a litigant relies on counsel's 
negligence as a basis for relief, the court must assess the claim under rule 60(b)(1). Because 
the litigant did not file the rule 60(b)(1) motion in time, the court of appeals did not resolve 
the claim's merits. In Yapp, the Tenth Circuit stated in dicta that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) 
permits relief for counsel's mistakes against which the client could not protect. The rule 
60(b) court correctly concluded that Mr. Menzies exercised insufficient diligence in 
protecting himself. Similarly, to the extent that Mr. Menzies contends that he was excusably 
negligent in relying on Mr. Brass, the rule 60(b) court rejected that argument, and, for the 
reasons argued in point I, Mr. Menzies has proven no error in that conclusion. 
In support of his argument that his reliance on Mr. Brass to litigate his case justifies 
rule 60(b)(1) relief, Mr. Menzies asserts that he "has limited access to telephones, and has no 
law library, clerk, paralegal, legal assistant, or prison contract lawyer for his post-conviction 
case . . . ." Mr. Menzies' cites no record support for the proposition that he would have had 
no access to the prison contract attorneys had he requested it. Mr. Menzies distorts the 
record about his telephone access. His own journals and other evidence that he presented to 
the rule 60(b) court demonstrate that he bombarded his attorneys with telephone calls and 
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B. Mr. Menzies did not seek rule 60(b)(1) relief timely. 
This Court may affirm the denial of rule 60(b)(1) relief on the alternative basis that Mr. 
Menzies did not seek it timely. State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996) (the Court may affirm 
the outcome on a theory that the lower court considered and rejected). In order to obtain rule 
60(b)(1) relief, Mr. Menzies had to file his motion "not more than 3 months after the judgment 
. . . was entered." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Relying on the April 11,2002, two-sentence pleading, 
Mr. Menzies asserted that he timely moved for rule 60(b)(1) relief.34 
Mr. Menzies filed no "motion" as the rules define "motion" until nineteen months after 
the post-conviction court entered judgment against him. A motion must "state with particularity 
the grounds" for relief. Utah R. Civ. P. 7. Mr. Menzies5 April 11, 2002, pleading stated no 
grounds for 60(b) relief. It even failed to cite any particular subsection on which Mr. Menzies 
contacted other attorneys by telephone to question Mr. Brass's representation and request 
court dockets (R. 3746; 4125 at 19-20, 39-40, 44-45, 60). 
Mr. Menzies also argues that agency principles cannot apply to hold him accountable 
for Mr. Brass's negligence because he did not hire Mr. Brass and could not fire him. 
Appellant's Brief at 26-27. Mr. Brass may have been appointed, but, as the rule 60(b) court 
concluded and as Mr. Menzies' testimony establishes, Mr. Menzies decided to keep him as 
his attorney despite his deficient performance. He has not argued that agency principles 
should not apply under those circumstances. Moreover, Mr. Menzies cites no authority to 
support his argument. He relies on a single state case, but only for the proposition that 
indigent clients cannot hire and fire their attorneys at will. Appellant's Brief at 27 n.62. He 
cites nothing for the proposition that appointed counsel do not act as their client's agent. 
Mr. Menzies also cites to a Seventh Circuit case for the proposition that a malpractice action 
ameliorates public concern about holding a client responsible for his attorney's negligence. 
Id. at 27 n.63. He fails to disclose that the United States Supreme Court held a capital state 
post-conviction petitioner liable for his appointed state post-conviction counsel's negligence 
under agency principles. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991) and 1990 Westlaw 
10022981 (demonstrating that Coleman's counsel was pro bono, not retained). 
34The rule 60(b) court accepted this argument. 
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relied for relief. Indeed, Mr. Men2ies expressly deferred stating any ground until he filed a 
"subsequent memorandum." See Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895,2002 UT 38 [^59 
(Holmes' single sentence request for leave to amend his complaint that failed to articulate "a 
single reason" why the court should grant leave to amend and was accompanied by no 
memorandum '"did not rise to the level of a motion'") (citing Calderon v. Kansas Dept of Social and 
Rehabilitative Services, 181 F.3d 1180,1187 (10th Cir. 1999)). He argued no ground for rule 60(b) 
relief until August 12, 2003. At best, the April 11, 2002, pleading amounts to notice that 
petitioner would move for rule 60(b) relief at some time in the future. That time was sixteen 
months too late. 
C. Mr. Menzies has not proven that he had a meritorious post-conviction claim. 
The rule 60(b) court could not relieve Mr. Menzies from the judgment unless he 
demonstrated that he had a "meritorious" post-conviction claim. See, e.g., Utah State Dept. of Social 
Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983). The Court may also affirm on the 
independent alternative basis that Mr. Menzies identified no meritorious claim. Mr. Menzies 
should have demonstrated that he had supportable claims that probably would have resulted in 
post-conviction relief, but for the unopposed judgment against him. He did not. To the 
contrary, he identified no claims beyond those asserted in the three post-conviction petitions. 
He ignored the unassailable basis for dismissing the first seventy-one claims (that he litigated and 
lost them on direct appeal). He ignored the detailed merits analysis in the summary judgment 
order, including the multiple claims that the post-conviction court concluded would fail as a 
matter even if Mr. Brass had presented additional evidence during the post-conviction 
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proceeding (R. 2230-60). As explained in point II, the Court should not set aside a judgment 
to litigate claims that Mr. Menzies has not demonstrated have a reasonable likelihood of resulting 
in post-conviction relief. 
Respondent recognizes that this Court's precedent has not imposed such a high 
"meritorious" showing. Previously, the Court has required a litigant to demonstrate only that 
he has a legal claim that, if factually proven, would entitle him to relief; however, he does not 
have to prove his case. See, e.g., Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, 2000 UT 75 ffl|28-29. However, the 
Court adopted that rule in the context of defaults entered at the beginning of the litigation and 
relied on that procedural context to support that rule. A majority of the Court has explained 
that a higher meritoriousness showing "at the very outset of a case, and prior to any discovery, places an 
unduly onerous burden on a defendant otherwise eligible for relief under Rule 60(b) " Utah 
State Dept. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1059 (Utah 1983) (Durham, J., dissenting, 
with two justices concurring) (emphasis added). 
The reasons for a lower meritorious showing do not apply here. The notice-pleading rule 
that applied in Lund and Musselman did not apply; Mr. Menzies was required to plead all of the 
facts on the basis of which he sought post conviction relief. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(3)(c). He 
should have had the supporting facts available when he included his claims, and should have 
presented them when he moved to set aside the post-conviction judgment. Moreover, the post-
conviction court entered the unopposed summary judgment in this case not at the outset, but 
at the case's end and only after years available for discovery and investigation. Similarly, Mr. 
Menzies' post-conviction case was not an entirely new proceeding that required discovery and 
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investigation. It was an action collateral to a criminal case with a fully developed record that 
provided Mr. Menzies with the principle tool for raising his ineffective-assistance claims. Cf. Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Ass'n. v. Unoy 932 P.2d 589, 592 (Utah 1997) (counsel's effectiveness "is in 
significant part a question of behavior observable from the record . . .").35 
Mr. Menzies never attempted to use the tools available to him to prove anything beyond 
the facial sufficiency of his claims. He has never acknowledged that the summary judgment 
analyzed and denied post-conviction relief on the merits, not on the basis of Mr. Brass's failure 
to oppose it. The Court should not set aside the judgment in order to litigate claims on which 
Mr. Menzies can never succeed, and certainly not on claims that would fail irrespective of any 
incomplete post-conviction investigation. 
IV. THE RULE 60(b) COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
JUDGMENT WAS NOT VOID 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) permits relief from a void judgment. The post-conviction 
judgment against Mr. Menzies would be "void" within the meaning of subsection (4) only if the 
post-conviction court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or acted in a manner 
inconsistent with due process. 'Richins v. Delbert Chipman <& Sons, Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah 
App. 1991). The rule 60(b) court reasoned that subsection (4) focuses on court action, and 
that, because most of Mr. Menzies5 arguments relied on Mr. Brass's deficient performance, he 
had not demonstrated that the post-conviction judgment was "void." The court also reasoned 
35Mr. Menzies seventy-one procedurally-barred claims also illustrate why the 
Musselman/ Lund mtiitoiiousntss standard should not apply. All seventy-one claims meet 
that standard: on their face, they state claims that, if proven, would entitle him to relief. 
However, all seventy-one have actually failed to provide him relief: he raised and lost them 
on direct appeal 
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that subsection (4) would apply only if the post-conviction court's conduct rendered it powerless 
to enter judgment; it concluded that the court-action on which Mr. Menzies relied did not meet 
that standard. (EL 3751-55.) 
Mr. Menzies demonstrates no error in this ruling. Mr. Menzies first contends that "many 
cases grant relief under 60(b)(4) as a result of due process denials stemming from inadequate 
performance by lawyers." Appellant's Brief at 9. He relies solely on Workman v. Nagk 
Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990). 
Mr. Menzies misrepresents Workman. Workman stands for the very proposition on which 
the rule 60(b) court relied: rule 60(b)(4) only applies when a due process violation renders the 
court powerless to enter the challenged judgment. In Workmen, that occurred because a party 
other than the one seeking to set aside the judgment failed to satisfy the conditions precedent 
to the court exercising authority over the action before it.36 
Mr. Menzies also argues that, even if the post-conviction "court had to be at fault" in 
order to justify subsection (4) relief, that occurred because the post-conviction court entered the 
summary judgment order without notifying Mr. Menzies or holding a hearing. Appellant's Brief 
at 9. Again, the argument establishes no error. 
First, in compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d), respondent served the judgment on Mr. 
3i
"Workman involved a class action commenced by a state agency. However, the 
agency never notified the class members of the action or of their right to disassociate 
themselves from the class, both of which "are critical requirements for maintenance of a 
class action." Id. at 753. The court of appeals held that the agency's failure to notify the 
absent class members of the class action voided the judgment in the agency's favor, 
permitting rule 60(b) relief to the class members. Contrary to Mr. Menzies' suggestion, 
Workman does not stand for the proposition that a party's own attorney's deficient 
performance renders a judgment "void." 
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Menzies' counsel (R. 2263). Mr. Menzies cites to nothing demonstrating that due process 
required the post-conviction court to serve him personally. Second, Mr. Menzies cites to 
nothing for the proposition that due process required the post-conviction court to hold a 
hearing on the unopposed summary judgment motion, especially when Mr. Menzies never 
requested one. Cf. Utah R. Judicial Admin. 4-501 (3) (A) (court will decide motion without a 
hearing unless a party requests one). 
The rule 60(b) court also rejected Mr. Menzies5 argument that the judgment was void 
because 1) the post-conviction court allegedly did not assess Mr. Brass's qualifications to 
represent Mr. Menzies; and 2) the post-conviction court did not remove Mr. Brass (R. 3754).37 
The rule 60(b) court found that neither event left the post-conviction court powerless to rule on 
respondent's summary judgment motion. 
Mr. Menzies' challenge to this conclusion assumes that every procedural misstep creates 
a due process violation that renders a judgment "void" under rule 60(b)(4). The law is 
otherwise. See Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, Co., 817 P.2d at 385 (Utah App. 1991) ("'[A] 
judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous or because some irregularity inhered in its 
rendition'") (citation omitted). 
Mr. Menzies also overstates what due process guaranteed to him during the post-
37Mr. Menzies' first argument distorts the record. Although the post-conviction court 
never questioned Mr. Brass about his qualifications, it did require Mr. Menzies' prior post-
conviction counsel to solicit attorneys who met Utah R. Crim. P. 8(e)'s qualifications (R. 
1155). Moreover, Mr. Brass met those qualifications (R. 4126 at 137-38). The second 
argument merely restates Mr. Menzies' assumption that the post-conviction court had an 
obligation to monitor Mr. Brass's performance. For the reasons argued in point I, Mr. 
Menzies fails to establish that the law imposed such an obligation. 
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conviction proceedings. He relies on Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945), as the 
roadmap for what due process guaranteed him in his state post-conviction case. Appellant's 
Brief at 6-12. However, Christiansen only defines the due process rights enjoyed when the State 
proceeds against a defendant to take his life or liberty; in that case, through a probation 
revocation. Id, See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that, because probation 
threatens the loss of conditional liberty, the State may have to provide appointed counsel, but 
only under limited circumstances). The State completed that stage of the proceedings seventeen 
years ago when it obtained a judgment against Mr. Menzies that forfeits his life. In the post-
conviction stage, Mr. Menzies was a civil litigant proceeding against the State to challenge his 
presumptively lawful conviction and sentence. He offers no analysis or authority for his 
assumption that the due process rights he enjoyed when the State proceeded against him apply 
when he proceeds against the state. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) ("the full 
panoply of rights due a defendant in [criminal] proceedings does not apply" in non-criminal 
proceedings). 
Mr. Menzies next argues that he had a constitutionally protected due process right to 
counsel who would perform the services described in the administrative rule. For sole support, 
he cites to Wolff v. McDonnell fot the proposition that state statutory procedural requirements "are 
also elements of due process." Appellant's Brief at 10. 
Mr. Menzies falsely suggests that the Supreme Court has held that the federal constitution 
protects every right that a state statute creates. Controlling law that Mr. Menzies does not 
acknowledge recognizes the contrary. See Kentucky Dept of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 
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461 (1989) (listing examples of cases where state statutes created federally protected rights and 
those where they did not). A state statute creates a federally protected liberty interest only when 
it 1) creates substantive limitations on official discretion, such as imposing substantive predicates 
to official decision-making; and 2) mandates the outcome if the relevant criteria have been met. 
Id. at 46. Mr. Menzies has not acknowledged this standard, let alone established that the statutes 
and rules on which he relies meet it.38 
In sum, Mr. Menzies identifies no due process violation let alone one that would have 
rendered the post-conviction judgment "void." The rule 60(b) court properly denied rule 
60(b)(4) relief. 
V. THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT APPLY PROSPECTIVELY, NOR HAVE 
EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO ITS ENTRY MADE ITS CONTINUED 
APPLICATION INEQUITABLE 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) permits relief from a judgment when "it is no longer equitable 
38Mr. Menzies also extrapolates that the ABA Guidelines for representing capital 
post-conviction petitioners define the "reasonable and necessary post-conviction legal 
services" that the administrative rule required Mr. Brass to provide. For sole support, he 
relies on Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). Appellant's Brief at 11 and n.18 and 19. 
Wiggins referred to the ABA Guidelines for representing capital defendants in criminal 
proceedings as one "guide" in determining whether Wiggins' counsel performed objectively 
deficiently in his capital murder trial. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 525. Wiggins does not 
extend to civil post-conviction cases. Although Mr. Menzies states that the Court "should" 
adopt the ABA Guidelines as the standard for counsel in Utah's capital post-conviction 
cases, he provides no analysis why the Court "should" do so. See State v. Honie, 57 P.3d 977, 
2002 UT 61 TJ61 n.7 (inviting the court to adopt a legal standard without arguing in "any 
meaningful way" why it should fails to satisfy the party's obligation to support his appellate 
arguments), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 863. Indeed, Mr. Menzies fails to disclose that the ABA 
Guidelines conflict with controlling Utah law. They require post-conviction counsel to "seek 
to litigate all issues, whether or not previously presented" ABA Guidelines for the Appointment 
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 10.15.1(C) (emphasis added). 
Utah law precludes such litigation as an "abuse of the writ." See, e.g., Carter v. Galetka, 44 
P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96 ffif 6-9. 
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that the judgment should have prospective application." To obtain relief under that subsection, 
Mr. Menzies had to prove that 1) the judgment has "prospective application;" and 2) subsequent 
events have occurred that make it inequitable to enforce the judgment's prospective 
components. BJchins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, Co., 817 P.2d 382, 386 (Utah App. 1991). 
Mr. Menzies argues that the summary judgment has "prospective application" because 
it "bars him from proceeding with his state habeas case, and will likely bar [him] from seeking 
relief from the errors alleged in the state post-conviction petition in federal or state courts." 
Appellant's Brief at 25.39 He relies solely on Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133 
(D.C. Or. 1988). 
Twelve John Does defeats rather than supports the "prospective application" argument that 
Mr. Menzies advances. According to the District of Columbia Circuit, a judgment has 
"prospective application" within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(5) when it is executory 
(requires a party to act or not act in the future) or requires a court to supervise "changing 
conduct or conditions." Id. at 1139. The D.C. Circuit held that the judgment at issue 
"definitively dismissed" the action against one party; therefore, it did not have "prospective 
application" and could not be set aside under subsection (5). 
39Mr. Menzies' argument that it had prospective application because it barred him 
from proceeding on his post-conviction petition is frivolous. The post-conviction court did 
not enjoin him from proceeding; it entered final judgment ending the post-conviction 
litigation. 
Mr. Menzies also argues that the discovery orders had prospective application because 
they first required Mr. Brass to fulfill his discovery obligation, then forbade Mr. Menzies 
from presenting additional evidence. Appellant's Brief at 25. Those orders compelled 
discovery and limited evidence in the post-conviction proceeding that the summary judgment 
terminated. They had no prospective application when Mr. Menzies sought relief from the 
post-conviction judgment. 
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Similarly, the summary judgment definitively ended Mr. Menzies5 post-conviction action. 
It did not order Mr. Menzies to perform or not perform some future act. There may be 
defenses that will bar merits review of some of his claims in other fora, but Mr. Menzies is not 
enjoined from seeking such relief. That the judgment has future collateral consequences does 
not mean that it has "prospective application" within the meaning of subsection (5). Id. at 1138 
(recognizing that all judgments have some "future reverberations," but that a judgment will have 
continuing consequences does not mean that it will have "prospective application"). See also Frew 
v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2003) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) "encompasses the traditional 
power of a court of equity to modify its decree in light of changed circumstances").40 
The rule 60(b) court also concluded that Mr. Menzies identified no events that post-dated 
the judgment that made it inequitable to continue its enforcement. (R. 3756.) Mr. Menzies does 
not dispute this conclusion. Instead, he argues that some of the events on which he relies for 
rule 60(b) relief occurred after the summary judgment. Specifically, he states that he relies on 
Mr. Brass's continued failure to notify him about the summary judgment and Mr. Brass's post-
judgment misinformation about the case status. Appellant's Brief at 9. 
Mr. Menzies did not make this argument below. He has not argued plain error on appeal. 
The claim fails for that reason alone. State v. Gulbransen, 106 P.3d 734, 2005 UT 7 ffi[46-48. I n 
40Mr. Menzies mistakenly argues that the summary judgment will bar merits review in 
federal court. Appellant's Brief at 25. It is the dismissed post-conviction appeal that will bar 
merits review in federal court because it will leave the post-conviction claims unexhausted. 
He also argues that it will bar federal merits review of claims raised in the post-conviction 
petitions. This is true only for claims first raised in those petitions. The aborted post-
conviction appeal will not bar federal review of claims that Mr. Menzies exhausted by 
presenting them to this Court on direct appeal. 
43 
any event, Mr. Menzies has not explained how Mr. Brass's misleading him about the fact that 
the judgment had been entered makes the judgment's terms inequitable. 
VL IF THE COURT REVERSES, IT SHOULD LIMIT ITS REVERSAL TO 
SETTING ASIDE THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SANCTIONS 
ORDERS 
A court may grant relief from judgment only "upon such terms as are just." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 60(b). Returning this case to its ten-year-old starting point would not be just. 
The criminal proceedings, where Mr. Men2ies' interests were paramount, lasted nine years 
from Ms. Hunsaker's murder. Mr. Menzies had two years to prepare for trial. The trial took one 
month to complete. The appeal, during which the Court allowed Mr. Menzies to present 
approximately three hundred pages of briefing (excluding the rehearing petition), lasted seven 
years and generated two opinions (R. 1282-1343, 1367-1591).41 
At this stage of the proceedings, society has a strong interest in finality. '"Justice 
demands that a convicted defendant have an opportunity to appeal in timely fashion, but once 
the appellate process has concluded, society's interest in the effectiveness and integrity of the 
criminal justice system requires a finality of judgment that should severely limit repetitive 
appeals."' Gerrishv. Karnes, 844P.2d315,320-21 (Utahl992) (quotingBundyp. DeLand,!63V.2d 
803, 805 (Utah 1988)).42 The over ten years of post-conviction and rule 60(b) litigation 
41The post-conviction record does not contain copies of the reply briefs, which raise 
the total pages to over three hundred. 
42In memoranda below, Mr. Menzies has attempted to distinguish Gerrish because Mr. 
Gerrish filed numerous petitions and this case involves Mr. Menzies' first post-conviction 
petition (R. 2563-64). That technical distinction does not detract from the opinion's policy 
statement. Gerrish expressly recognizes that the finality interest attaches after the criminal 
proceedings end, not after successive post-conviction petitions. Moreover, Gerrish cited to 
44 
continues to defeat that interest. 
Moreover, Maurine Hunsaker's family have an independent right to speedy resolution 
of the post-conviction proceedings. Utah Code Ann. §77-38-7(2) (West 2004). Matt Hunsaker, 
as Maurine's representative, has detailed how the violation of that right has affected her 
surviving family members (R. 4123 at 14-18). The Court should not sanction further violation 
by allowing petitioner to start his ten-year-old post-conviction case all over again. 
In addition, Mr. Menzies' hands are not clean. As detailed in point IIB, Mr. Menzies 
personally abused the discovery process during the post-conviction proceedings. 
Under these circumstances, it would not be just to allow Mr. Menzies to return to the 
ten-year-old starting point of the state post-conviction case. If the Court reverses, it should limit 
any 60(b) relief to setting aside the summary judgment and discovery sanctions order. 
VII. THE RULE 60(b) COURT DID NOT VIOLATE SALT LAKE LEGAL 
DEFENDER ASS'N. V. UNO AND MR. MENZIES HAS NOT 
DEMONSTRATED THAT THIS COURT SHOULD EXPAND THE 
DOCUMENT-DESTRUCTION ORDER. 
The rule 60(b) court allowed both parties to conduct appropriate discovery for the rule 
60(b) evidentiary hearing (R. 3339-41). Mr. Menzies asserted that some of the documents that 
respondent requested were privileged. The rule 60(b) court ordered them produced for 
purposes of the rule 60(b) evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the court ordered respondent 
to return the originals and destroy all working copies. On appeal, Mr. Menzies argues that the 
rule 60(b) court violated Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n. v. Uno, 932 P.2d 589 (Utah 1997). He 
Bundy v. DeLand for the policy statement. Bundy was an appeal from the denial of relief in a 
first post-conviction petition. Bundy v. Deland 763 P.2d at 804. 
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asks this Court to expand that order to require respondent to search its files for copies of the 
same documents that he received from other sources and destroy those copies as well. 
A. Additional relevant facts. 
The rule 60(b) court ordered an evidentiary hearing, initially limited to communications 
between Mr. Menzies and Mr. Brass (R. 3172-73). To prepare for the January 15,2004, hearing, 
respondent served a request to produce all documents related to communications with all of his 
prior post-conviction counsel (R. 3345-46). At a hearing on January 7,2004, the rule 60(b) court 
ruled that "[i]f either side believes that evidence is relevant to this hearing, the Court suggests 
that you produce the documents, you subpoena the witnesses, and then you present the evidence 
as you deem appropriate, and the Court will heat objections and rule on them on a question-and-
objection basis the Court reminds counsel again that the scope of the hearing can be as wide 
or as narrow as you deem appropriate." (R. 4127:15). 
Mr. Menzies filed no objection to respondent's document request until January 5, 2004 
(R. 3495-00).43 He did not move for a protective order and permission to file documents under 
seal until that date (R. 3510-12). The evidentiary hearing was already scheduled for a date sooner 
than the time to respond his Mr. Menzies' motion (R. 4127:5). At the hearing on January 7, 
2004, respondent requested a continuance of the evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of the 
withheld documents prior to the hearing. Id. Mr. Menzies objected to the request for a 
43The objection included an index of approximately forty withheld documents (R. 
3496-99). 
46 
continuance, and the request was denied (R. 4127:6).44 
After a discussion about the withheld documents, counsel for Mr. Menzies said: "If there 
were a way to give the State this information for purposes of this hearing, and say you can't use 
this information for any other reason, I would feel perfectly comfortable giving it to them." (R. 
4127:17). She also said: 'Tour Honor, we are willing for [counsel for Respondent] to review all 
the documents I am withholding. We don't want them shown to anyone else and we don't want 
them photocopied. But, in good faith, we will show her those documents." (R. 4127:20). 
The rule 60(b) court ordered Mr. Menzies to turn over all of the withheld documents (R. 
4127: 23-24). It further ordered that "For the purposes of the January 15, 2004 hearing, those 
documents will be used only by counsel representing the respondent and only for the purposes 
of preparing and conducting the January 15 hearing," and the originals would be keptintact and 
returned to Mr. Menzies. It deferred ruling on what would happen to any working copies until 
the appropriate time. (R 4127:22-24.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Menzies objected to respondent referring to disputed 
documents offered as Exhibits A, B, C, and D (R. 4125:104-106). The parties were given an 
opportunity to put their arguments and objections on the record (R. 4125:115-119; 4126:127-
131).45 The court took the matter under advisement over night, to re-read Uno, and conduct an 
44Following Mr. Menzies's objection to any continuance, and after the motion for a 
continuance to resolve the issue concerning the motion for a protective order was denied, 
the rule 60(b) court stated that it would not take anything in camera or anything off the 
record (EL 4127 at 8). 
4Respondent objected to any reliance on Uno, arguing that by objecting to a 
continuance so that the issue could be properly briefed and resolved, Mr. Menzies waived 
any privilege claim he had to those documents (R. 4126:127). Respondent also argued that 
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in-camera review of Exhibits A, B, C and D (R. 4125:106; R. 4126:123-26). 
The rule 60(b) court ruled that the four documents in exhibits A through D were not 
admissible and ordered respondent, at the conclusion of the hearing to shred any copies of them. 
Id.46 The court also ruled, however, that "[i]n the event that counsel for the respondent chooses 
to pursue questioning that may have its basis in Exhibits A through D, the Court requests that 
counsel come to the bench for a side bar, we will discuss it, and then the questioning will 
proceed on a question-and-an opportunity-to-object basis for each question" (R. 4126:125). 
Respondent's counsel proceeded as the court ordered.47 
B. The rule 60(b) court did not violate Uno* and Mr. Menzies cites no authority for requiring 
respondent to destroy documents he received from sources other than Mr. Menzies. 
Mr. Menzies waived any claim that Uno barred production of the challenged documents. 
First, he affirmatively waived it when he stated his willingness to produce the documents under 
conditions that would prevent public disclosure of the information in them. The rule 60(b) 
court followed the procedure Mr. Menzies considered acceptable. He cannot fault the rule 60(b) 
Mr. Menzies had put Exhibits A through D in issue, thereby waiving any privilege, by relying 
on information from those documents to support his Rule 60(b) motion (R. 4126:129). 
46Mr. Menzies falsely asserts that Respondent failed to comply with the court's order 
(Menzies brief at 47). The record cite he refers to is his own counsel's statement as to 
whether Respondent had complied, during argument concerning destruction of all of the 
documents on the index - not simply Exhibits A, B, C and D (R. 4134:46), which were the 
only items the court ordered destroyed immediately following the hearing. 
47Menzies falsely implies that respondent violated the court's order by stating that 
counsel used information from various documents from the index "at time [sic] approaching 
the bench before referring to these matters, and at times not (Menzies brief at 46). However, 
the court had not ordered counsel to approach the bench as to questions about every 
document from the index. The court only required counsel to first approach the bench 
before asking questions specifically about Exhibits A, B, C and D (R. 4126:125). 
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court for taking the path that he suggested. See, e.& State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,158-59 (Utah 
1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). 
Second, he raised no timely privilege claim. He first raised the privilege issue too close 
to the evidentiary hearing to give respondent an adequate opportunity to address it. He 
succeeded in preventing a continuance in order to give respondent that opportunity. 
Moreover, even if the rule 60(b) court should not have ordered Mr. Menzies to produce 
those documents, he cites no authority to show that the rule 60(b) court abused its discretion 
when it denied the extraordinary relief he requests. Mr. Menzies asks this Court to require 
respondent "to identify the documents from the index for which [he] claims to have an 
independent source" and destroy those documents. Appellant's Brief at 48. The rule 60(b) 
court specifically declined to grant this relief. The rule 60(b) court properly determined that "[i]f 
they [respondent] had information from an independent source and have developed that 
information, this Court does not have the authority to compel them to shred and destroy and 
cease referring to that information." (R. 4134:47).48 
On April 5, 2004, the court signed a written order which stated that the order to shred 
and destroy "does not apply to documents or copies of documents that were already in 
respondent's possession, or that were or may be provided to respondent from some other source 
(even though they might be duplicates of items on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD 
48Menzies acknowledges that the court did not arely heavily" on information from 
documents he listed on his index of allegedly privileged items, but points out that the court 
referred to a journal entry (Menzies brief at 48, n. 83). However, it was counsel for Menzies 
who introduced the journal as Exhibit 21 and who asked that a redacted copy be admitted 
(R. 4126:158-160). 
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DOCUMENTS)5' (R. 3900-01). 
Mr. Menzies cites no authority for his position that respondent should be required to 
identify and destroy documents received from an independent source, and this Court should not 
order it to do so.49 If respondent attempts to use any documents in the future that Menzies 
believes are privileged, Menzies may raise an objection at that time. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued, Mr. Menzies has not proven that the rule 60(b) court improperly 
declined to set aside the post-conviction judgment against him. If the Court disagrees, it should 
limit any relief to setting aside the unopposed summary judgment and sanctions order. 
DATED August 29, 2005. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
)MAS BRUNK 
ERIN RILEY 
Assistant Attorneys General 
49In addition, Respondent could not do so unless Menzies is ordered to provide the 
documents to Respondent again. Respondent complied with the rule 60(b) court's order, 
therefore, it has no documents that Menzies claims are privileged to compare to the other 
documents in its files. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that, on August 29,2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF was mailed by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, to Mr. Menzies' counsel, EIZABETH 
HUNT L.L.C., ELIZABETH HUNT, at 569 Browning Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah 84105. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
§ 7 8 - 3 5 a - 2 0 2 . Appointment and payment of counsel in death penalty 
cases 
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and 
sentence has been affirmed on appeal shall be advised in open court, on the 
record, in a hearing scheduled no less than 30 days prior to the signing of the 
death warrant, of the provisions of this chapter allowing challenges to the 
conviction and death sentence and the appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants. 
(2)(a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall 
determine whether the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record 
regarding the defendant's indigency. If the court finds that the defendant is 
indigent, it shall promptly appoint counsel who is qualified to represent 
defendants in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised 
on the record by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the 
court may accept the rejection. 
(c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in 
providing the representation provided for in this section shall be paid from 
state funds by the Division of Finance according to rules established pursuant 
to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
RULE 8. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
(a) A defendant charged with a public offense has the right to self representa-
tion, and if indigent, has the right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant 
faces a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty. 
(b) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent 
defendant who is charged with an offense for which the punishment may be 
death, the court shall appoint two or more attorneys to represent such defen-
dant and shall make a finding on the record based on the requirements set forth 
below that appointed counsel is proficient in the trial of capital cases. In 
making its determination, the court shall ensure that the experience of counsel 
who are under consideration for appointment have met the following minimum 
requirements: 
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys
 tmust have tried to verdict six 
felony cases within the past four years or twenty-five felony cases total; 
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or 
co-counsel in a capital or a felony homicide case which was tried to a jury and 
which went to final verdict; 
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have completed or taught 
within the past five years an approved continuing legal education course or 
courses at least eight hours of which deal, in substantial part, with the trial of 
death penalty cases; and 
(4) the experience of one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than 
five years in the active practice of law. 
(c) In making its selection of attorneys for appointment in a capital case, the 
court should also consider at least the following factors: 
(1) whether one or more of the attorneys under consideration have previous-
ly appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a capital case; 
(2) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have sufficient time 
and support and can dedicate those resources to the representation of the 
defendant in the capital case now pending before the court with undivided 
loyalty to the defendant; 
(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have engaged in the 
active practice of criminal law in the past five years; 
(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys being considered; 
and 
(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination that counsel to 
be appointed will fairly, efficiently and effectively provide representation to the 
defendant. 
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to death, the court 
shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent such defendant on appeal and 
shall make a finding that counsel is proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To 
be found proficient to represent on appeal persons sentenced to death, the 
combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following 
requirements: 
(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in at least three felony 
appeals; and 
(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed within the past 
five years an approved continuing legal education course which deals, in 
substantial part, with the trial or appeal of death penalty cases. 
(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent 
petitioner pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(a), the court shall 
appoint one or more attorneys to represent such petitioner at post-conviction 
trial and on post-conviction appeal and shall make a finding that counsel is 
qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-conviction cases. To 
be found qualified, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must 
meet the following requirements: 
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have served as counsel in at 
least three felony or post-conviction appeals; 
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or 
co-counsel in a post-conviction case at the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or 
otherwise demonstrated proficiency in the area of post-conviction litigation; 
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have attended and completed 
or taught within the past five years an approved continuing legal education 
course which dealt, in substantial part, with the trial and appeal of death 
penalty cases or with the prosecution or defense of post-conviction proceedings 
in death penalty cases; 
(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to judgment or 
verdict three civil jury or felony cases within the past four years or ten cases 
total; and 
(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attorneys must total not 
less than five years in the active practice of law. 
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow the guidelines set 
forth in this rule shall not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed 
counsel ineffectively represented the defendant at trial or on appeal. 
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be paid as described 
in Chapter 32 of Title 77. 
(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel shall be paid pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c). 
RULE 12. MOTIONS 
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, 
which, unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in 
accordance with this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particulari-
ty the grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not 
be accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the court. 
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. When the time for filing a response to a 
motion and the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the 
motion for decision. The request shall be a separate pleading captioned 
"Request to Submit for Decision/' The Request to Submit for Decision shall 
state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing memoran-
dum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, 
and whether a hearing has been requested. The notification shall contain a 
certificate of mailing to all parties. If no party files a request, the motion will 
not be submitted for decision. 
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request, 
including request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable 
of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to 
trial by written motion. 
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(c)(1)(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or 
information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge 
an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during the 
pendency of the proceeding; 
(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidence; 
(c)(1)(C) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(c)(1)(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or 
(c)(1)(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c)(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 76-3-402, shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior 
to the date of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten 
days of the entry of conviction. Motions for a reduction of criminal offense 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 76-3-402 may be raised at any time after 
sentencing upon proper service of the motion on the appropriate prosecuting 
entity. 
(d) Motions to Suppress. A motion to suppress evidence shall: 
(d)(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed; 
(d)(2) set forth the standing of the movant to make the application; and 
(d)(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the 
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to 
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them. 
If an evidentiary hearing is requested, no written response to the motion by 
the non-moving party is required, unless the court orders otherwise. At the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court may provide a reasonable time 
for all parties to respond to the issues of fact and law raised in the motion and 
at the hearing. 
(e) A motion made before trial shsill be determined before trial unless the 
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. 
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state 
its findings on the record. 
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make 
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall 
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from 
such waiver. 
(g) Except injustices' courts', a verbatim record shall be made of all proceed-
ings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as are made orally. 
(h) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the 
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be 
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new 
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evi-
dence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) 
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or dis-
charged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision 
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule 
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve 
a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
RULE 2 0 1 . JUDICIAL NOTICE OF AD JUDICATIVE FACTS 
(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts. 
(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determina-
tion by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When Discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether request-
ed or not. 
(d) When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. A parly is entitled upon timely request to an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the 
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request 
may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of Taking Notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. 
(g) Instructing" Jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct 
the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, 
the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as 
conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
R25-14-6. Withdrawal of Counsel. 
(1) If an attorney appointed under Section 78-35a-202 is 
permitted to withdraw by the court or, due to death or 
disability, is unable to continue, the attorney shall be paid 
only for the actual work performed to the date of withdrawal as 
certified by the court. 
(2) If withdrawal is ordered by the court because of counsel's 
improper conduct or the court finds that a foreseeable conflict 
of interest which should have been disclosed prior to appointment 
existed, all compensation received by the attorney shall be 
repaid to the Division of Finance. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Petitioner, 
: ORDER RE: RESPONDENT'S 
vs. MOTION TO DISMISS 
HANK GALETKA, Utah State Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Prison Warden, : 
Respondent, Case No. 950902713HC 
The Court held a hearing on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
on December 22, 1998. Petitioner was present and represented by 
Edward K. Brass. Respondent Hank Galetka was represented by 
Assistant Attorneys General J. Frederic Voros, Jr. and Angela K. 
Micklos. The Court heard argument and took the matter under 
advisement. The Court having reviewed the papers submitted by 
counsel, reviewed the file and records of the case, and heard 
oral argument on the motion, 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICti 
Sail Lake Ctount*/ b'ah 
FEB 0 2 199? 
iM Deputy 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The claims asserted in subparagraphs G) 1 through 71 of 
the Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or for Post-Conviction 
Relief are dismissed. 
2. The Court finds that the claims identified in paragraph 
1 of this order have been previously adjudicated on direct appeal 
and on the petition for rehearing, and that no unusual 
circumstances exist to permit the Court to grant a hearing on any 
of these clair 
DATED: J a n t l S f y ^ , 1999 
l i m g . 
>: (IaaKtSry C" If 
Approved as to form 
BY THE CC 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
HANK GALETKA, Utah State 
Prison Warden, 
Respondent. 
FINDING OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 37 
SANCTIONS 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Case No. 950902713HC 
The Court, having reviewed the papers counsel submitted, 
enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
order granting respondent's Motion for Utah R. Civ. P. 3 7 
Sanctions. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 5, 1995, pro bono counsel, Ms. Mary Corporon, 
appeared to represent petitioner in this collateral challenge to 
his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence. 
2. On April 26, 1995, Ms. Corporon filed petitioner's 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief. 
3. On May 2, 1995, Ms. Corporon filed petitioner's Amended 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief. 
4. On May 3, 1995, three additional pro bono counsel 
appeared to represent petitioner: Mr. Alan Sullivan, Mr. Todd 
Shaughnessy, and Mr. Matthew Durham, all lawyers with Van Cott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. 
5. On December 13, 1995, irespondent moved for permission to 
conduct discovery. 
6. On May 6, 1996, the Court granted respondent permission 
to conduct discovery. 
7. On May 17, 1996, respondent served his First Set of 
Interrogatories to Petitioner. 
8. On June 12, 1996, the Court awarded petitioner $2,000 
for an investigator. 
9. On August 23, 1996, respondent moved for the Court's 
leave to depose petitioner. 
10. Respondent filed a motion to compel petitioner's 
answers to respondent's first interrogatories. In October 1996, 
the Court granted respondent's motion to compel and ordered 
petitioner to serve his answers to respondent's first 
2 
interrogatories by October 9, 1996. The Court also granted 
respondent's motion to depose petitioner. 
11. On October 22, 1996, when petitioner did not answer the 
first interrogatories, respondent moved for sanctions. 
12. On January 9, 1997, before the Court ruled on the 
motion for sanctions, petitioner served his answers to the first 
interrogatories. Petitioner has never supplemented those 
responses. 
13. As of July 1, 1997, the legislature provided petitioner 
funds for an investigator and attorneys fees. 
14. On October 24, 1997, and December 15, 1997, petitioner 
requested appointment of paid counsel qualified under Utah R. 
Crim. P. 8. 
15. On February 19, 1998, the Court appointed petitioner's 
present counsel. 
16. Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition on August 
24, 1998. The second amended petition added an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim and three substantive claims related 
to the jury that convicted him. 
17. Respondent scheduled petitioner's deposition for 
December 10, 1998. On December 9, 1998, petitioner's counsel 
notified respondent's counsel that petitioner refused to be 
deposed. Petitioner offered no legal reason for his refusal. 
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18. On December 21, 1998, respondent moved to compel 
petitioner's deposition. Petitioner did not respond to the 
motion to compel. 
19. On June 11, 1999, the Court granted the motion to 
compel. 
20. Respondent rescheduled petitioner's deposition for 
November 5, 1999. On November 4, 1999, petitioner's counsel 
informed respondent's counsel that petitioner would not cooperate 
in the deposition. Petitioner's counsel stated that petitioner 
believed he should not be deposed while he still had time during 
the discovery period to investigate his claims. 
21. Respondent's counsel appeared for the deposition at the 
scheduled date and time. Petitioner appeared with counsel. 
Petitioner initially refused to answer questions. When asked his 
reason, petitioner responded, "I don't know. Don't want to." 
The deposition ultimately terminated at petitioner's request 
based on his claim that his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination prohibited any questions about his 
communications with his criminal trial counsel. 
22. Respondent filed a second motion to compel on December 
3, 1999. Respondent challenged the legal sufficiency of 
petitioner's claim that the Fifth Amendment prohibited deposing 
petitioner. 
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23. Petitioner did not respond to the motion. 
24. On March 13, 2000, the Court granted the second motion 
to compel the deposition. 
25. Respondent concluded petitioner's deposition on June 1, 
2000. 
26. In a letter dated August 14, 2000, respondent asked 
petitioner to supplement his January 9, 1997, answers to 
respondent's first interrogatories, detailing several 
deficiencies in the initial answers. Respondent's counsel further 
stressed the need for the responses before deposing the attorneys 
petitioner claimed represented him ineffectively. 
27. By letter dated September 14, 2 000, respondent enclosed 
a stipulation for additional interrogatories. Respondent also 
agreed that petitioner could provide the supplemental answers to 
the original discovery with his responses to the additional 
discovery. 
28. On October 2, 2000, when petitioner failed to sign and 
return the stipulation for additional interrogatories, respondent 
moved for permission to serve the additional interrogatories. 
29. After the Court granted respondent permission to serve 
the additional interrogatories, respondent served them, along 
with his first request for production of documents, on December 
18, 2000. Petitioner's responses were due January 17, 2001. 
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30. Petitioner did not respond to the second 
interrogatories or first production requests. Petitioner also 
provided no supplemental responses to the first interrogatories 
as respondent requested. 
31. On January 24, 2001, respondent hand-delivered a letter 
to petitioner's counsel. The letter requested petitioner to 
answer all outstanding discovery by February 9, 2001. The letter 
further stated respondent would file a motion to compel if 
petitioner did not provide the answers. 
32. Petitioner did not respond to the January 24, 2 001, 
letter. 
33. On February 15, 2001, respondent filed a motion to 
compel. Respondent moved for an order compelling completed 
responses to his first set of interrogatories and responses to 
his second set of interrogatories and document production 
request. 
34. Petitioner did not respond to the February 15, 2001, 
motion to compel. 
35. In its March 2 8th Order, the Court, among other things: 
1) concluded that petitioner's answers to respondent's first 
interrogatories were deficient as detailed in respondent's 
memorandum and incorporated respondent's recitation of the 
deficiencies; 2) concluded that petitioner had not responded 
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timely to the second interrogatories and document production 
requests; and 3) concluded that petitioner had ample time 
available to complete his investigation; consequently, petitioner 
should have the information necessary to answer the discovery 
readily available. Based on its findings and conclusions, the 
Court ordered petitioner to provide the discovery responses 
"forthwith." 
36. Petitioner did not comply with the Court's March 28, 
2 001, order compelling discovery. 
37. On April 19, 2 0 01, respondent moved for Utah R. Civ. P. 
37 sanctions. Respondent asked the Court to prohibit petitioner 
from introducing any evidence to support his claims beyond that 
already in the record and disclosed in the discovery to date. 
38. Petitioner never responded to the sanctions motion. 
39. Petitioner has never voluntarily complied with his 
discovery obligations. Instead, when petitioner has provided 
discovery, he has done so only after at least one order 
compelling him to do so and sometimes only after respondent has 
moved for sanctions when he has not complied with orders 
compelling discovery. Petitioner has ignored the Court's latest 
order compelling discovery responses. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The 1997 version of Utah R. Civ. P. 37 governs this case 
because petitioner commenced the action before the 1999 
amendments became effective. 
2. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b) and (d) (1997) permit sanctions 
when a party fails to respond timely to interrogatories and 
document production requests or when the party refuses to comply 
with an order compelling discovery. 
3. Petitioner has not responded timely to the written 
discovery and has refused to comply with the Court's March 28, 
2 0 01, order compelling discovery. Each independently supports 
imposing sanctions against petitioner. 
4. Rule 37 permits the Court to grant sanctions "as are 
just." It includes as a suggested sanction "an order refusing to 
allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated 
claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing 
designated matters in evidence." Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (B) 
(1997) . 
5. Petitioner has: 1) willfully refused to cooperate in 
discovery; and 2) engaged in persistent dilatory tactics. Each 
independently supports imposing sanctions against petitioner. 
6. Petitioner has willfully refused to cooperate in 
discovery because he has intentionally refused to respond to 
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legitimate discovery requests and disobeyed the Court's orders 
compelling discovery. The record establishes that petitioner's 
failure to cooperate was not involuntary. 
7. The facts found above demonstrate petitioner's 
persistent delay tactics in the discovery process. 
8. Petitioner's willfulness and delay tactics have 
frustrated respondent's legitimate attempts to discover the 
complete evidentiary and legal bases for petitioner's claims. 
9. Respondent's requested relief - prohibiting petitioner 
from providing any evidence to support his claims beyond that in 
the existing record and discovery responses to date - is just 
under the circumstances. 
10. Respondent's April 19, 2001, motions for sanctions is 
unopposed and meritorious. 
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ORDER 
Based on the above findings and conclusions, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Respondent's April 19, 2001, Motion for Utah R. Civ. P. 
3 7 Sanctions is GRANTED. 
2. Petitioner is prohibited from supporting his claims with 
any evidence beyond that already contained in the existing record 
and in his discovery responses to date. 
DATED 
BY THE COURT: 
RAYMOND S. UNO B / F ' ^ ^ A * 
Third District Court Judge i/w^^'t^i f 
X^ >.^= .'"9-
Approved as to form: ^^^a1^'" • 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
HANK GALETKA, Utah State 
Prison Warden, 
Respondent. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
ORDER DISMISSING 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF, AND 
JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Case No. 950902713HC 
On October 29, 2001, respondent filed a summary judgment 
motion and supporting memorandum asking the Court to dismiss 
petitioner's remaining claims with prejudice and enter final 
judgment in respondent's favor. Petitioner filed no response. 
Having reviewed the papers filed on the summary judgment 
motion, the Court: 1) finds that, for purposes of the motion, the 
parties do not dispute the facts recited in respondent's 
memorandum supporting his summary judgment motion; 2) makes the 
conclusions of law recited below; and 3) grants respondent's 
summary judgment motion, dismisses the petition with prejudice, 
and enters judgment in respondent's favor. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
Respondent's memorandum supporting his summary judgment 
motion recites 14 0 paragraphs of facts that respondent does not 
dispute for purposes of this motion. Respondent relied on the 
record from the underlying criminal proceeding and the discovery 
conducted in this case, including petitioner's deposition 
testimony. Respondent reserved his right to challenge the 
ultimate veracity of the facts recited. 
Petitioner filed no response to the summary judgment 
memorandum. In addition, the Court previously granted 
respondent's discovery sanctions motion and entered an order 
prohibiting petitioner from supporting his claims with any 
evidence beyond that already contained in the existing record and 
in the discovery responses provided prior to the sanctions order. 
Therefore, the Court finds that, for purposes of this 
summary judgment motion, the parties do not dispute the facts 
recited in respondent's statement of undisputed material facts, 
adopts that fact statement, and incorporates it by this 
reference. 
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LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) requires the Court to enter 
judgment for a party when, on the undisputed material facts, the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
JURY CLAIMS 
2. Petitioner claims that the State denied him his state 
and federal constitutional right to a fair jury trial because: 1) 
someone "tampered with the jury in an effort to deny the 
petitioner of the jury he and his counsel selected;" 2) "voir 
dire was not adequately conducted;" and 3) the Court improperly 
excused "a juror or jurors." 
3. Petitioner may not relitigate in post-conviction 
proceedings claims that failed on direct appeal; the Court must 
dismiss such claims as an abuse of the writ. 
4. Petitioner also may not litigate in post-conviction 
proceedings claims that he could have, but did not raise on 
direct appeal unless he demonstrates unusual circumstances 
excusing the failure. 
5. Petitioner raised a jury-tampering claim on direct 
appeal. To the extent petitioner's post-conviction jury-
tampering claim repeats his direct appeal claim, petitioner 
abuses the writ by bringing it. 
6. Petitioner could have, but did not raise on direct 
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appeal his claims concerning voir dire and excusing jurors. To 
the extent petitioner's post-conviction jury-tampering claim 
differs from his direct appeal jury-tampering claim, petitioner 
also could have, but did not raise that claim on direct appeal. 
Petitioner has identified no unusual circumstances justifying the 
failure to raise these claims on direct appeal. Therefore, the 
Court must dismiss the claims as procedurally barred. 
7. The procedural dispositions in paragraphs 2 through 5 
provide bases for dismissing the substantive jury challenges in 
claim 73 independent of the claim's merits. 
8. Alternatively, petitioner's substantive, post-conviction 
jury challenges fail on their merits. State post-conviction 
proceedings provide a remedy only for substantial denials of 
constitutional rights during the underlying criminal trial. The 
only constitutional right petitioner had with respect to the jury 
was the right to trial by an impartial jury. None of 
petitioner's jury tampering claims allege a deprivation of a 
constitutional right. 
9. Petitioner asserts that someone attempted to tamper with 
the jury to deprive him of the jury he selected. Petitioner had 
no right to a particular jury; only the right to an impartial 
jury. In addition, an attempt to tamper with the jury 
demonstrates no deprivation of a constitutional right. Finally, 
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the Court dismissed the juror who received outside information, 
and the juror shared it with none of the other jurors before the 
Court excused him. The record clearly demonstrates that the 
"attempt" did not affect petitioner's right to an impartial jury. 
10. Petitioner also attacks the voir dire's adequacy and 
claims that the Court improperly excused jurors. The allegations 
are insufficient as a matter of law to justify post-conviction 
relief: neither address the ultimate issue of whether a biased 
juror sat. 
11. On the basis of the undisputed facts, respondent is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on petitioner's claim 73 
on the independent bases that the claim is procedurally barred, 
and that it fails on its merits. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: GENERAL 
12. Petitioner challenges the constitutional adequacy of 
his representation at the guilt and penalty phases. Petitioner 
claims: 1) trial counsel did not obtain petitioner's prison file 
prior to the penalty phase, even though counsel had advance 
notice the State planned to call a witness to verify petitioner's 
record (claim 72a); 2) trial counsel developed insufficient 
evidence to impeach Walter Britton, and specifically failed to 
demonstrate that Mr. Britton's statement to police tracked media 
reports exactly (claims 72b and g); 3) counsel failed to 
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investigate petitioner's alibi that he was attempting to meet 
with his parole officer at the time of the murder (claim 72c); 4) 
counsel failed to present evidence that Ms. Hunsaker purportedly 
had a history of repeatedly absconding from employment and from 
her husband (claim d); 5) counsel insufficiently investigated 
facts that would have identified someone else as the murderer 
(claim e); and 6) counsel purportedly conducted no significant 
penalty phase investigation (claim f). 
13. In order to succeed on these claims, petitioner has the 
burden of proving two elements. First, he must identify the 
specific acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. To meet his burden on this element, 
petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance. The Court must give counsel wide 
latitude to make tactical decisions and may not question 
strategic decisions unless no reasonable basis exists for them. 
14. The Court accepts the Tenth Circuit's articulation of 
the first element that respondent cites in his brief: petitioner 
must establish that his counsel's decisions were "completely 
unreasonable, not merely wrong." See, e.g., Boyd v. Ward, 179 
F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1167 
(2000) . Therefore, petitioner must establish that counsel failed 
to do what the constitution compelled, not just what may have 
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been prudent or appropriate. He cannot succeed merely by showing 
that counsel's choices appear ill-advised in hindsight. 
15. Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to effective 
representation also entitled him to counsel who would reasonably 
investigate the case facts. However, that right did not entitle 
petitioner to the investigation that the best criminal defense 
lawyer would have conducted when supplied with unlimited time and 
resources, and with the benefit of hindsight. As with tactical 
decisions about what evidence to present, the Court must assess 
counsel's investigation decisions with a heavy measure of 
deference to counsel's judgments. In addition, the 
reasonableness of counsel's investigation decisions depends 
critically upon what petitioner told them. 
16. The second element requires petitioner to prove that 
the challenged acts or omissions undermine confidence in the 
outcome of his criminal trial. To challenge his death sentence 
successfully, petitioner must establish a reasonable probability 
that the sentencer would have struck the balance of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances in petitioner's favor. 
17. Petitioner has the burden of proving both elements; the 
failure to prove either element independently defeats an 
individual claim. With respect to counsel's investigation 
decisions at both phases, petitioner's burden requires him to 
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demonstrate that evidence existed that counsel failed to find as 
a result of constitutionally deficient investigation. 
18. The Court's prior orders prohibited petitioner from 
presenting additional evidence; therefore, he must meet his 
burden, if at all, on the existing record. 
19. As detailed in the following subsections, petitioner 
cannot, as a matter of law, meet his burden to prove either 
element on any of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
Therefore, respondent is entitled to summary judgment. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: PRISON RECORD (claim 72a) 
20. Petitioner claims his trial counsel performed 
constitutionally deficiently by failing to obtain his prison file 
prior to the penalty phase. According to petitioner, his counsel 
should have known the State would rely on the file because it 
listed a witness to verify petitioner's "record." 
21. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that counsel 
relied on her experience as a criminal defense attorney in 
relation to the witness listed to verify petitioner's record. 
When the State proffered petitioner's entire prison file, counsel 
explained that, in her experience, witnesses called to 
authenticate prison records only authenticated prior convictions. 
She argued that identifying a witness to authenticate 
petitioner's record therefore gave her insufficient notice that 
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the State would rely on the entire file, including prison 
disciplinary and progress reports, at the penalty phase. 
22. Petitioner has no evidence to demonstrate that counsel 
unreasonably assessed what aggravation the import of calling a 
witness to authenticate petitioner's record. Petitioner must 
prove that counsel's assessment was unreasonable at the time she 
concluded the State intended to offer only petitioner's prior 
convictions as aggravation evidence. That subsequent events 
proved counsel made a mistake does not satisfy petitioner's 
burden. Trial counsel's unrebutted assertion that, in her 
experience, proving petitioner's record meant only proving his 
prior convictions defeats the first ineffective assistance 
element. 
23. On this record, petitioner also cannot prove to a 
"demonstrable reality" that the Court would have struck the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
petitioner's favor if counsel had obtained the file sooner. 
24. First, counsel secured the Court's agreement not to 
review the file until defense counsel reviewed it. The Court 
then gave counsel time to review the file. The reasonable 
inference from the record is that counsel had all the time they 
needed. Counsel never objected that the time allotted was 
insufficient. After calling the last defense witness, counsel 
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informed the Court that any further defense evidence would depend 
on the prison file contents. The only remaining evidence then 
offered was petitioner's unsworn letter expressing his 
condolences to the family and professing his innocence. 
25. Second, defense counsel attacked the reliability of 
negative information in the file. Trial counsel called a witness 
who explained that inmates often had no opportunity to respond to 
allegations in disciplinary reports, and that the prison did not 
always follow up on the allegations. The State presented no 
rebuttal evidence. 
26. Third, trial counsel argued mitigating evidence from 
the file, including that: 1) petitioner supported his family with 
his prison job income; 2) petitioner had excelled academically in 
prison; and 3) petitioner followed his superiors' orders, 
mediated between inmates and staff, and showed loyalty and 
kindness to those who treated petitioner with respect. When it 
imposed sentence, the Court specifically noted that the prison 
files contained "quite a few" positive entries. 
27. Finally, petitioner has not and cannot produce evidence 
that counsel would have offered at the penalty phase but for 
their failure to obtain the file sooner. Without such evidence, 
petitioner's assertion of prejudice is mere speculation. He 
cannot prove that the evidentiary picture would have been 
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different at all, let alone meet his burden to prove a reasonable 
likelihood that the Court would have balanced the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in petitioner's favor. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: WALTER BRITTON TESTIMONY (claims 72b and 
a! 
28. Petitioner claims his trial counsel performed 
deficiently because they did not develop evidence to establish 
that Mr. Britton's testimony tracked media accounts of Ms. 
Hunsaker's murder. In a separate claim, he generally asserts 
that counsel failed to develop and present "evidence which would 
have impeached and discredited Walter Britton." In discovery 
responses, petitioner also complains that David Kling attempted 
to contact counsel to discredit Mr. Britton, and that counsel did 
not investigate Mr. Kling's offer. 
29. Petitioner cannot prove counsel insufficiently 
developed evidence to attack Mr. Britton's credibility. Counsel 
developed evidence Mr. Britton only agreed to testify when he 
thought his testimony would net him some benefit in his federal 
bank robbery prosecutions or requests for prison transfers, but 
refused to testify when he believed he would obtain no benefit. 
30. Petitioner also cannot demonstrate any constitutional 
deficiency in counsel's investigation of Mr. Kling. Although 
LDA's files contained a letter in which Mr. Kling purportedly 
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agreed to discredit Mr. Britton's testimony, petitioner has no 
proof that Mr. Kling wrote the letter, or that counsel failed to 
investigate the offer Mr. Kling purportedly made. Petitioner 
cannot prove the factual predicate for this part of his claim. 
31. Even assuming Mr. Kling offered to testify on 
petitioner's behalf and that counsel did nothing to investigate 
the offer, petitioner still cannot demonstrate counsel performed 
objectively unreasonably. To the contrary, counsel could have 
legitimately concluded that the risks of calling Mr. Kling far 
outweighed any benefit. Counsel knew that Mr. Kling, like Mr. 
Britton, reported to police that petitioner confessed to killing 
Ms. Hunsaker. Mr. Kling's account of petitioner's confession 
corroborated Mr. Britton's on many details, including that: 1) 
petitioner slit Ms. Hunsaker's throat; 2) he murdered her so she 
could not testify about the Gas-A-Mat robbery; 3) petitioner kept 
Ms. Hunsaker's identification; and 4) petitioner told the other 
inmates to watch the news broadcast about the murder. In 
addition, Mr. Kling provided police with petitioner's only 
admission that he hid Ms. Hunsaker's identification at the jail. 
If counsel had called Mr. Kling to attack Mr. Britton's veracity, 
the State could have impeached Mr. Kling with his prior statement 
that corroborated Mr. Britton's on many details. 
32. Alternatively, petitioner cannot demonstrate that any 
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error undermines confidence in the guilt verdict. Petitioner has 
no proof that Mr. Britton's testimony actually tracked media 
accounts. In any event, counsel argued without contradiction 
that Mr. Britton could have discovered all the information to 
which he testified through the media. 
33. Similarly, petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel's 
omission of Mr. Kling's testimony undermines confidence in the 
jury's verdict. Petitioner has no admissible proof that Mr. 
Kling would have attacked Mr. Britton's credibility if counsel 
had called him in 1988. Petitioner has no proof that Mr. Kling 
sent the letter in which he purports to offer to testify that Mr. 
Britton and Mr. Benitez fabricated petitioner's confession. 
Similarly, petitioner's reliance on a triple hearsay account of 
an unidentified investigator who reported that, in 1995, Legal 
Defender Associations's 1988 investigator told him that Mr. Kling 
contacted LDA and offered to tell the truth cannot support his 
claim. 
34. In addition, petitioner concedes that he does not know 
how Mr. Kling would testify today. Mr. Kling may deny ever 
offering to testify on petitioner's behalf. He may deny that he 
sent any letter to counsel or otherwise contacted counsel's 
office with such an offer. He may have stood by his police 
statement and corroborated petitioner's confessions to Mr. 
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Britton with an account of similar confessions to him. 
35. Finally, even without Mr. Britton7s testimony, the 
State proved petitioner's guilt with overwhelming, albeit 
circumstantial evidence. Petitioner lived three to four blocks 
from the Gas-A-Mat. Police found Ms. Hunsaker's thumbprint in 
the car petitioner had in his possession at the time she 
disappeared. Police found Ms. Hunsaker's identification in a 
jail room to which petitioner ran after the booking officer asked 
for petitioner's belongings. Police found Ms. Hunsaker's social 
security card in petitioner's girlfriend's belongings. Police 
found Ms. Hunsaker's purse at petitioner's house. Carpet fibers 
found on Ms. Hunsaker's clothes matched the lime green shag 
carpeting from petitioner's apartment. At petitioner's 
direction, Mr. Denter retrieved approximately the same amount of 
cash from petitioner's apartment that was stolen from the Gas-A-
Mat. A witness identified a photograph of petitioner as the most 
like a man he saw at the murder scene wearing a coat similar to 
petitioner's and in the company of a woman wearing clothes 
similar to those found on Ms. Hunsaker's body. Petitioner's 
knives could have been used to nearly decapitate Ms. Hunsaker. 
Ms. Hunsaker's murderer may have used handcuffs to bind her to a 
tree; petitioner possessed handcuffs. Even without Mr. Britton's 
testimony that petitioner confessed to killing Ms. Hunsaker, all 
14 
the evidence pointed to petitioner. Evidence further impeaching 
Mr. Britton would have made no difference. Petitioner cannot, as 
a matter of law, demonstrate that its omission undermines 
confidence in the outcome. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: ALIBI EVIDENCE (claim 72c) 
36. Petitioner asserts he attempted to see his parole 
officer on the morning of the murder, then went to job services. 
37. Petitioner acknowledges that counsel investigated his 
parole office alibi and discovered he did not see his parole 
officer on the morning of the murder. He further acknowledges 
that he did not in fact see his parole officer that morning. He 
claims, however, that he could not see his parole officer the 
morning of the murder because the parole office held an 
unscheduled, emergency meeting. Petitioner contends that, had 
counsel developed that evidence, it would have corroborated his 
version that he at least went to the office because he otherwise 
would not have known about the emergency meeting. 
38. On this record, petitioner cannot overcome the 
presumption of constitutionally adequate representation with 
respect to the alleged parole office alibi. The record 
demonstrates that counsel made a strategic decision to omit all 
evidence of petitioner's parole status. That decision 
necessarily precluded them from presenting evidence that 
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petitioner attempted to visit his parole officer the morning of 
Ms. Hunsaker's murder. 
39. Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the decision was 
objectively unreasonable; to the contrary, the record 
demonstrates that counsel sacrificed a marginal alibi defense to 
keep the jury from finding out that petitioner was on parole from 
another crime at the time of Ms. Hunsaker's murder. Petitioner 
never explains how the jury would have learned that he knew about 
the special meeting: petitioner did not testify at trial and has 
never asserted his willingness to do so. Petitioner also 
overstates the evidence's significance. It would have shown only 
that he knew about the meeting. Attempting to contact his parole 
officer by telephone would have provided the same information. 
On the other hand, counsel knew that petitioner's parole officer 
had questioned all reception personnel and reported to police 
that they all denied that petitioner came to the parole office 
the morning of the murder. In other words, the omitted evidence, 
at most, would have presented to the jury information that 
petitioner could have discovered by telephone, would have 
resulted in testimony from all reception personnel that 
petitioner did not go to the office the morning of Ms. Hunsaker's 
murder, and would have let the jury determining his guilt or 
innocence know that he was on parole. 
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40. On this record, petitioner also cannot overcome the 
presumption of constitutionally adequate performance as to the 
alleged job services alibi. First, petitioner gave conflicting 
deposition testimony about what investigation he believed counsel 
did. He asserted both that he never knew what counsel did to 
investigate the alleged job services alibi, and that he knew they 
did nothing. As to the latter, petitioner asserted counsel told 
him they did nothing, but when asked when they told him, he 
merely responded, nIt never happened. They didn't have nothing." 
41. Petitioner also cannot meet his burden with respect to 
both alleged alibis because he has no evidence to prove that 
either or both stops provided him with a complete alibi. 
Specifically, the evidence demonstrates that he had Troy Denter's 
car - the car in which police discovered Ms. Hunsaker's thumb 
print - until noon the day of Ms. Hunsaker's murder, and that he 
drove it approximately 120 miles. Petitioner has no proof that 
he could not have murdered Ms. Hunsaker and made both stops 
before returning the car to Mr. Denter. 
42. Alternatively, petitioner cannot prove to a 
demonstrable reality that proceeding on the alibis would have 
made an acquittal reasonably likely. First, petitioner cannot 
prove at least one of the facts on which he predicates this 
claim: He cannot prove that job services in fact had a record 
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that he visited the morning of the murder. Moreover, the "alibi" 
evidence petitioner claims counsel should have presented did not 
prove that he could not have muirdered Maureen Hunsaker. On the 
other hand, the other circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly-
proved that petitioner did kill her. On these undisputed facts, 
petitioner cannot prove to a demonstrable reality that counsel's 
decisions undermine confidence in the outcome. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: INVESTIGATION TO IDENTIFY WHO KILLED MS. 
HUNSAKER (claim 72e) 
43. Petitioner claims that trial counsel did not fully 
investigate facts that would have suggested someone else murdered 
Ms. Hunsaker. Petitioner's interrogatory answers suggest this 
claim duplicates his alibi claim: petitioner explained that 
counsel should have investigated whether someone else killed Ms. 
Hunsaker because he told counsel he was somewhere else at the 
time of her murder. In his deposition, petitioner added only 
that counsel would have found the real killer if they had done 
any "reasonable" investigation. 
44. The undisputed facts demonstrate petitioner cannot meet 
his burden on either ineffective assistance element for this 
claim. Petitioner admits that he has no evidence to support this 
claim beyond that supporting his claim that counsel 
insufficiently investigated his alibi defense. Petitioner has 
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not demonstrated that the constitution required additional 
investigation, or that it would have yielded any evidence 
suggesting another person may have murdered Ms. Hunsaker, let 
alone evidence sufficient to overcome the overwhelming evidence 
of petitioner's guilt. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: VICTIM CHARACTER EVIDENCE (claim 72d) 
45. Petitioner claims his trial counsel performed 
deficiently because they did not present evidence that Ms. 
Hunsaker "repeatedly abscond[ed] from employment and from her 
husband." Amended Petition at 37. Petitioner asserts in his 
interrogatory answers that Ms. Hunsaker uhad previously 'run 
away' from her home and her husband to spend time with men other 
than her husband, subsequently giving as an excuse that she had 
not done so voluntarily." Interrogatory Answers at 6. 
Petitioner contends the evidence would have cast doubt on the 
kidnapping and robbery aggravators, affecting both the homicide 
degree and penalty phase aggravating evidence. 
46. As a matter of law, petitioner cannot prove either 
ineffective assistance element on this claim. 
47. By his own admission, petitioner has no witnesses or 
exhibits to prove that Ms. Hunsaker previously ran away from 
family and work to spend time with other men, then claimed she 
did not do so voluntarily. Therefore, he cannot demonstrate what 
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information counsel had that should have led them to investigate 
these allegations or that they would have found any support for 
them. 
48. The record demonstrates that petitioner's trial counsel 
knew the importance of challenging the kidnapping and robbery 
aggravators. Counsel developed evidence and argued from the 
defense and State's evidence that the State had not met its 
burden to prove either a robbery or kidnapping. Counsel 
emphasized that there were no signs of a struggle in the 
cashier's booth. They developed evidence that Ms. Hunsaker was 
unhappy and depressed, making comments about wanting to get away 
from her family, involved in a lengthy paternity action, and seen 
with a man other than defendant after she disappeared from the 
Gas-A-Mat. At the end of the State's case, counsel moved to 
dismiss, arguing that the State provided insufficient evidence to 
prove either aggravating circumstance. With no evidence beyond 
that which counsel presented, petitioner cannot meet his burden 
to overcome the presumption that counsel did all that the 
constitution required. 
49. Alternatively, petitioner cannot meet his burden to 
prove that counsel's performance undermines confidence in the 
outcome. As stated, petitioner admits he has no evidence to 
support his assertion that Ms. Hunsaker ran away and later 
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claimed she did not leave voluntarily or any other evidence 
concerning Ms. Hunsaker's background and mental state beyond that 
which his trial counsel actually presented, let alone sufficient 
evidence to prove to a demonstrable reality that counsel 
overlooked evidence sufficiently compelling to overcome the 
State's case. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: PENALTY PHASE INVESTIGATION (claim 72f) 
50. Petitioner claims that his trial counsel conducted no 
substantial penalty phase investigation. Petitioner claims that 
trial counsel failed to obtain petitioner's prison file "at all," 
did not object to its contents adequately, and did not argue 
mitigating evidence from the file. He also contends unidentified 
additional investigation would have yielded unidentified 
information about petitioner's prior abuse and victimization, and 
unidentified information to demonstrate Ms. Hunsaker likely left 
the Gas-A-Mat voluntarily rather than as the result of robbery or 
abduction. 
51. The Court has already ruled that petitioner cannot 
demonstrate that counsel should have investigated further whether 
Ms. Hunsaker left voluntarily, that they would have found any 
additional evidence, or that it would have overcome the State's 
evidence establishing that petitioner robbed and kidnapped Ms. 
Hunsaker. 
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52. As a matter of law, petitioner cannot prevail on his 
claim assertions concerning his prison file. First, petitioner's 
allegations concerning his prison file rely, in part, on obvious 
record misstatements. Counsel did obtain the file and argued 
mitigating evidence from it. 
53. Second, petitioner's challenge to counsel's objections 
to admitting the file abuses the writ. Counsel objected to 
admitting the file on numerous grounds, the Court overruled the 
objections and admitted the file, and the Utah Supreme Court 
rejected the appellate challenge to the Court's rulings. 
Petitioner may not relitigate his unsuccessful appellate claim by 
recasting it as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Because petitioner already litigated this claim, the Court 
dismisses it irrespective of its merits. 
54. Alternatively, the supreme court's disposition 
forecloses petitioner's ineffective assistance claim. The 
supreme court already determined that, even if error, admitting 
the file was harmless because the bad acts evidence in the file 
paled in comparison to the admissible aggravating evidence. That 
holding forecloses the ineffective assistance prejudice element. 
55. Petitioner also can prove neither ineffective 
assistance element on his challenge to counsel's penalty phase 
investigation and presentation. First, the record demonstrates 
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that trial counsel developed evidence on each of the points 
petitioner asserts they should have. Trial counsel's mitigation 
case incorporated: 1) family member testimony and expert 
testimony about the abuse petitioner suffered as a child; 2) 
expert testimony about how his childhood prevented him from 
developing a normal value system; 3) expert testimony that, 
although he qualified for an anti-social personality diagnosis, 
he possessed personality traits that would assist him in curbing 
his anti-social acts; 4) evidence that, with petitioner's record, 
he had little chance of ever obtaining parole; 5) evidence that 
other inmates serving long sentences had changed their behavior; 
6) evidence that petitioner would be housed in the most secure 
area of the prison, and that petitioner had escaped only from a 
lower security area; 7) evidence concerning his good behavior in 
prison; 8) affidavits from seven Utah criminal defense attorneys 
that included information about the proportionality of sentencing 
petitioner to death; and 9) a letter from petitioner expressing 
his remorse. In addition, counsel argued positive elements from 
petitioner's prison file, such as acting as a mediator between 
inmates and guards in disputes and complimentary work 
evaluations, and the Court expressly acknowledged that the file 
contained positive statements about petitioner. Petitioner has 
failed to identify any overlooked evidence. On the other hand, 
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the State's aggravation case: 1) detailed petitioner's extensive 
criminal history, including twice robbing and one time kidnapping 
the same 7-11 clerk and robbing and shooting a cab driver who 
worked three jobs of his last dollar; 2) provided evidence that 
petitioner's girl friend smuggled a screw driver to petitioner in 
a secured mental health facility; and 3) relied on the 
circumstances of Ms. Hunsaker's murder. Petitioner has refused 
to identify any overlooked evidence, let alone evidence so 
compelling that it creates a reasonable likelihood that the Court 
would have struck the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
evidence in petitioner's favor. Therefore, the claim fails as a 
matter of law. 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based on the papers filed, and on the undisputed facts and 
legal conclusions recited above, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Respondent's summary judgment motion is GRANTED; 
2. Petitioner's claims 72 and 73 are DISMISSED with 
prejudice; 
3. As the Court has now denied all of petitioner's post-
conviction claims, the Court DENIES the petition for post-
conviction relief, DISMISSES the petition with prejudice, and 
orders judgment entered in respondent's favor. 
DATED ^Ji/U/*sjQ-&<? //, SiOtf^ 
BY THE COURT: 
Raymond S. Uno 
District Court Judge, 
Approved as to form: 
Edward Brass 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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Addendum E 
EDWARD K. BRASS (#432) 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 322-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 322-5677 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison 
Warden 
Respondent. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
Case No. 950902713 
Judge Uno 
? ? f i a A 
The petitioner, by his attorney, moves the Court to enter an order setting aside the judgment 
entered in this case on or about January 11, 2002, pursuant to Rule 60 (p\ U.R.C.P. 
The specific grounds for this motion shall be set forth in a subsequent memorandum. 
DATED this j j day of April, 2002. 
Attorney for the Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Thomas B. Brunker 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney General 
Box 140854 
Salt Lake UT 84114-0854 
DATED this J J L day of April, 2002. 
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1 about your own case. And did you in fact tell Mr. Brass or 
2 give him some suggestions of things that you thought should be 
3 included in the amended petition? 
4 A I probably did. I did. 
5 Q And did you ask him to provide you with a copy of the 
6 amended petition that he filed? 
7 A I asked him to provide me with a copy of anything he 
8 generated or anything the State give him or anything, yes, I 
9 did. 
10 Q And did he ever give you a copy of the amended 
11 petition? 
12 A No, ma'am. 
13 Q Did you ever talk with Mr. Brass about Troy Denter? 
14 A Nope. 
15 MS. RILEY: Your Honor, if counsel could approach the 
16 J bench, we need to discuss one of the issues raLised earlier. 
17 THE COURT: You may. 
18 (Off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
19 THE COURT: The record will reflect that the Court 
20 I has conferred with counsel at the bench on matters relating to 
21 I examination of the witness. And you may proceed. 
22 J Q (By Ms. Riley) Mr. Menzies, you spoke with an 
23 I investigator named Ron Lax, didn't you? 
24 A Yes, ma1 am. 
25 Q Mr. Menzies, in your deposition that you gave on 
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June 1 of 2000, when Mr. Brass was present, and I will give you 
a copy of that, so that you can refer to it, as well, to 
refresh your recollection, if you would turn to page 50, and 
looking down, towards the bottom of page 50, it says, you were 
asked a question whether you had any other specific information 
that would identify someone else as the murderer. And you 
answered, "Specific information, no." Is that an accurate 
statement of what was said at the deposition? 
A I am trying to find where you are at here. Yeah, 
that's pretty accurate. 
Q But that's not the same information that you told 
Mr. Lax, is it? 
A Well, I told Mr. Lax to look somewhere else; but, 
specifically, I give him some ideas. 
Q In fact, didn't you give Mr. Lax a specific name? 
A To look at? Yes, ma'am. 
Q Mr. Menzies, showing you a copy of what has been 
marked as Respondent's Exhibit C, but not admitted as an 
exhibit yet, if you would read that very first line at the top 
of the page. If you would look at page 4, and read that first 
line to yourself. 
A I did. 
Q And when you were asked the question at the 
deposition, if you had specific information that would identify 
someone else as the murderer, you gave information that was 
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contrary to what you told Mr. Lax, didn't you? 
A Yes and no. 
Q Well, I guess you better explain yourself, then. 
What do you mean by "yes and no"? 
A If you can't prove something, it is not, you know, if 
you have got someone to look for something in a certain area, 
you have them look for it.. 
Q So at the time of your deposition were you saying 
that they would not be able to prove that? 
A Me? 
Q You were asked if you had any specific information 
that would identify someone else as the murderer? 
A No, I can't prove nothing. 
Q And you answered no at your deposition? 
A And I just answered no again. 
Q But that' s different than the information you gave to 
Mr. Lax, isn't it? 
A When I talked to Mr. Lax, it was more of a 
conversation than giving information. It was giving ideas and 
everything. 
MS. RILEY: Your Honor, could we approach the bench 
again? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
THE COURT: The record will reflect that the Court 
1 conferred with counsel at the bench regarding the cross 
2 examination of the respondent. You may proceed. 
3 Q (By Ms. Riley) Mr. Menzies, let me ask you again. At 
4 the deposition you were asked if you had any other information 
5 that would identify someone else as the murderer. 
6 MS. HUNT: Objection. Would you use the language 
7 that was used by Mr. Brunker, please. 
8 MS. RILEY: That was Mr. Brunker. 
9 I THE COURT: Counsel, if you have anything to discuss, 
10 make sure you discuss it between you off the record. Anything 
11 on the record, direct it to the Court or the witness. 
12 (An off-the-record discussion was held.) 
13 Q (By Ms. Riley) Mr. Menzies, you were asked first the 
14 question, "Let me ask it a little more specifically. Did you 
15 have any other information that would identify someone else as 
16 the murderer?" 
17 A Are you talking about at the deposition? 
18 Q At the deposition, yes. And then you went off the 
19 record for a moment. You came back. Counsel for the State 
20 asked again, and said, "I believe the question was whether you 
21 had any other specific information that would identify someone 
22 else as the murderer." 
23 A OK. 
24 Q And you answered, "Specific information, no"; is that 
25 right? 
1 A Yes, ma1am, I did. 
2 Q And that's different than what you told Ron Lax, 
3 isn't it? 
4 J A Somewhat, yes. 
5 Q If it is only somewhat, what's the part that's not 
6 J different? 
7 I A Well, when they first asked me this question at the 
8 deposition, I talked to Ed Brass about it off the record, as 
9 you can see here, when we took a recess. And I am under the 
10 I sentence of death. I am an ex-convict. I needed my attorneys 
11 to do some investigation instead of just giving you folks what 
12 everything we had. So when he asked that thing, because I 
13 didn't have the specific facts, that was just something someone 
14 I told me, I took it that way, and that's how I answered it. 
15 Q And that's different than what you told Mr. Lax, 
16 isn't it? 
17 J A Yes, ma'am. 
18 I Q Thank you. Mr. Menzies, you asked Mary Corporon not 
19 to mention Troy Denter, didn't you? 
20 A No. I actually told her not to. 
21 Q So you told her not to mention Troy Denter? 
22 A Until she investigated it. 
23 J Q And do you still have your journal in front of you 
24 there? 
25 A Yes, I do. 
1 Q Would you turn to the date that is January 21 of 
2 1996. 
3 A Excuse me? 
4 Q January 21, 1996. 
5 A Right. 
6 Q And that's on page 19 of your journal? 
7 A Twenty-one. 
8 Q Whoops, sorry. And you wrote in your journal, "Wrote 
9 Mary C. Corporon and told her that I donf t want anyone 
10 connected with my case to mention Troy DenterTs name at all"; 
11 isn't that correct? 
12 A Correct. 
13 Q And you have told us earlier that Mary Corporon sent 
14 you copies of all the pleadings in your case. And she also 
15 sent you a copy of the interrogatories, and her initial answers 
16 to the interrogatories, didn't she? 
17 A Does it say that in my journal? I am not being rude. 
18 I just don't remember. 
19 Q Let me see if I can help you out a little. Are we at 
20 Exhibits G and H? 
21 THE CLERK: G and H, that would be correct. 
22 Q (By Ms. Riley) Showing you a copy of what has been 
23 marked for identification as Exhibit G, does that refresh your 
24 I memory as to — 
25 I A Yes, that's my writing. 
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THE COURT: You may proceed. 
Q (By Ms . Riley) So, Mr. Menzies, looking at what has 
been marked for identification as Exhibit G, do> you recall now 
whether you previously have seen that document? 
A Obviously, I have. 
Q Would you turn to page 8 of that document. 
A I am there. 
Q And looking at the answer to interrogatory question 
number it looks like 6(c), there is some information that has 
been blocked out there. 
A Yes, ma'am. 
Q Did you block out that information? 
A I think so. 
MS. HUNT: Could I interpose an objection at this 
point? I am not sure what Mr. Menzies' work with Ms. Corporon 
on the interrogatories has to do with his communication with 
Mr. Brass. 
THE COURT: What is your objection legally? 
MS. HUNT: Relevance and scope of the hearing. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (By Ms. Riley) I am sorry, Mr. Menzies, did you 
answer, yes, you have blocked out that information? 
A I said I think I did, yeah. It looks like my 
initials there. 
Q Do you recall what it was that you blocked out there? 
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A No. But I imagine it is probably about Troy. 
Q Showing you what has been marked for identification, 
but not admitted yet, as Exhibit H. Would you look at the 
answer there. And does that appear to be an answer to the same 
question without the portion blocked out? 
A Sort of. 
MS. HUNT: What's your question? 
THE COURT: Counsel, if you want to confer, you may. 
If you want to make an objection, state it legally, and let's 
go back on the record. Proceed. 
Q (By Ms. Riley) Mr. Menzies, did you understand that 
these were answers to questions that counsel for the State was 
asking? 
A I guess I understand that, yeah. 
Q And in the answer, the proposed answer that Mary 
Corporon provided to you, before they were given to the State, 
did you cross off the portion that said, "Others have confessed 
to or bragged about committing the murder in issue"? 
A No, I don't think so. 
Q What is it you believe you crossed out there? 
A I believe it is to do with the same thing, but they 
rewrote — if you notice, they rewrote it. It is not just the 
same thing that's crossed out. Do you understand what I am 
saying? 
Q Right. You understand that the answers that were 
1 provided to the State were corrected or answers made with 
2 additions; is that correct? 
3 A ThatT s correct. 
4 Q And is it fair to say that you did not want Mary 
5 Corporon to answer to the State that others had confessed to or 
6 bragged about the murder in question? 
7 A It would be fair to say that I wanted my attorneys 
8 and I expected my attorneys to investigate my case before they 
9 handed stuff over to you people to where you could screw it up. 
10 Q So you wanted the version that was given to the State 
11 to not say that others had confessed to or bragged about 
12 committing the murder? 
13 A Let me read the question, first, would you? 
14 Q Sure. 
15 A Ask me again, would you, please. 
16 Q You wanted the version of the answers to these 
17 interrogatories that went to the State not to say that others 
18 have confessed to or bragged about committing the murder? 
19 A I wanted my attorneys, pure and simple, to 
20 investigate, get information for me, get information, evidence 
21 for me before they give stuff to the State, yes, ma1am. 
22 Q So you didn't want that information to be given to 
23 the State in this interrogatory? 
24 I A I just answered you. 
25 Q Is that correct? You didn't want the State to be 
1 given that information? 
2 A No, I didn!t. I said until my attorneys had 
3 investigated stuff, no, I did not. 
4 Q Showing you now what has been marked for 
5 identification as State's Exhibit I. Do you recognize that 
6 document? 
7 A I have seen it. 
8 Q It is entitled "Waiver"/ is that correct? 
9 A Yes, ma'am. 
10 Q And this is a waiver that you signed for your trial 
11 counsel, Brooke Wells and Frances Palacios; is that correct? 
12 A No. 
13 Q Who did you sign it for? 
14 A Well, I know it is going to sound stupid, but I 
15 signed a whole bunch of papers that just had where my name is, 
16 because they wanted to get records, they wanted to do 
17 everything else, and so I signed a bunch of papers for them. 
18 Q And would you take a look at this document now, then, 
19 and see if you recall reading that and if that's what you 
20 intended to sign. 
21 A No. 
22 Q No, that's not what you intended to sign? 
23 A Isn't that what I just said? 
24 Q But you did sign it; is that correct? 
25 A Ma'am, it was a blank piece of paper. I signed a 
1 J whole bunch of them. 
2 Q So what you are telling ine is that you just signed 
3 your name to a blank piece of paper? 
4 A A whole bunch of them. 
5 Q And then they typed this information in later? 
6 A Yes, ma'am. 
7 Q That's what you are accusing your trial attorneys of 
8 doing? 
9 A Or whoever done it, yeah. 
10 MS. RILEY: Your Honor, the State would ask that 
11 Exhibit I be admitted. 
12 THE COURT: Any objection? 
13 MS. HUNT: No objection, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: It is received. 
15 (Respondent's Exhibit I was received into evidence.) 
16 Q (By Ms. Riley) Mr. Menzies, when you were told that 
17 the State wanted to take your deposition, did you want to have 
18 your deposition taken? 
19 I A No, ma1 am. 
20 Q And what were your reasons for why you did not want 
21 to have your deposition taken? 
22 A At the time? They changed over times. But at times, 
23 to be perfectly honest with you, I didnft want to give — talk 
24 to you bastards that's trying to kill me. 
25 Q So you just, sort of in general, didn!t want to have 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official 
Publication) 
JACKSON. 
*1 Appellants (hereafter Armenta) challenge the trial 
court's denial of their Motion to Vacate Judgment. 
We affirm. 
Whether the trial court rightly concluded that 
Armenta's motion falls under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(1) rather than Rule 60(b)(6) is a 
question of law that we review for correctness. See 
Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. S. Properties, 
838 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Armenta 
contends that both his attorneys and Federal Financial 
failed to serve him properly with pleadings. ["FN 11 
FN1. In connection with this argument, 
Armenta contends he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel. However, "ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a[S]ixth Amendment 
right limited to criminal law." Richins v. 
Delbert Chipmcm & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 
386n.2(UtahCt.App.l991). 
As to his attorneys, any negligent behavior by the 
attorneys "is attributable to [Armenta] through 
principles of agency." Russell v. Martell 681 P.2d 
1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). Amenta's claim-that his 
attorneys' negligent behavior prejudiced the result of 
the case-falls under Rule 60(b)(1). See Lincoln 
Benefit. 838 P.2d at 675. Rule 60(b)(6) "may not be 
resorted to for relief when the ground asserted for 
relief falls within subparagraph 1" of Rule 60(b). 
Russell 681 P.2d at 1195. Thus, the trial court 
correctly concluded that Armenta's motion falls under 
Rule 60(b)(1). 
The record reveals only two instances when Federal 
Financial served papers in what might be considered 
an irregular fashion. However, both these instances 
were harmless. In the first instance, Federal Financial 
served the Motion for Summary Judgment on Chacon 
more than a month after she had withdrawn as 
Armenta's counsel. Nonetheless, Armenta responded 
to that motion just a few weeks later, indicating that 
he did receive the motion in a timely fashion. In the 
second instance, Federal Financial served the court's 
Order Granting Summary Judgment on Russell more 
than two months after he withdrew as Armenta's 
counsel. However, several weeks earlier, the court 
itself served a minute entry on Armenta at the 4133 
South 2200 West address, indicating that summary 
judgment had been granted to Federal Financial. 
TFN21 
FN2. There is no indication in the record 
what relation this address has to Armenta. 
We can infer, however, that it was a valid 
address to make contact with Armenta, as it 
was first used by his attorney Russell. Also, 
Federal Financial mailed the Notice of Entry 
of Judgment to Armenta at that address, by 
certified mail, and the record gives no 
indication that the Notice of Entry of 
Judgment was returned as undeliverable. 
Armenta also complains that Federal Financial 
should have served him only at his home or business 
address. He cites no authority mandating this result, 
nor do we perceive any good reason to follow the 
rule he suggests. In fact, during those times that 
Armenta was represented by counsel, Federal 
Financial was required to serve him through that 
counsel. See Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1) (stating when 
party is represented by counsel, "service shall be 
made upon the attorney unless service upon the party 
is ordered by the court" (emphasis added)). 
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Our review of the record and the applicable law 
persuades us that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied Armenta's Motion to 
Vacate Judgment. [FN3] The Motion was filed on 
November 16, 1998, more than three months after the 
order from which Armenta appealed. Thus, 
Armenta's motion was untimely. See Utah R.Civ.P. 
60(b)(1). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
denial of Armenta's Motion to Vacate. 
FN3. Armenta argues we should err on the 
side of affording him a foil opportunity to 
present his argument. However, " '[t]he rule 
that the courts will incline towards granting 
relief to a party, who has not had the 
opportunity to present his case, is ordinarily 
applied at the trial court level....' " Heath v. 
Mower. 597 P.2d 855. 858 (Utah 1979) 
(quoting Airkem Inlermountain, Inc. v. 
Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 68. 513 P.2d 429, 
431(1973)). 
BENCH and BILLINGS. JJ., concur. 
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